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I.. INTRODUCTION
A. The Question
In these hard economic times, many homeowners find that their
mortgages exceed the value of their homes. This has triggered an
intense debate as to whether a homeowner may use bankruptcy to
reduce the lien of the mortgage to the value of the home-to "strip
down" the mortgage.' The Supreme Court recently held in Dewsnup v.
Timm2 that mortgage strip down is not permitted in Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy.- The question whether Chapter 13 bankruptcy can be used to
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; A.B., Occidental Col-
lege; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles.
** Pepperdine University School of Law, class of 1994; B.A., University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles.
1. Some courts and commentators use the terms "cramdown" or "bifurcation" to
describe this process. The authors will follow the Supreme Court's terminology, see
infra note 3, and use the term "strip down," which is an appropriate term because
the issue is whether the amount of the lien is reduced, or "stripped down," to the
value of the home. Cramdown is a less specific and therefore less helpful term.
Bifurcation may occur without the lien being stripped down; for reasons totally
unrelated to a strip down, see supra note 215, it may be necessary to bifurcate an
undersecured home mortgagee's claim into a § 506(a) "secured claim" for an amount
equal to the value of the home and a § 506(a) "unsecured claim" for an amount
equal to the remainder of the debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988); see infra note 29
for statutory text. Courts that use the term "bifurcation" when referring to strip down
usually use it as shorthand for bifurcating and modifying the § 506(a) unsecured
claim.
2. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
3. Id. at 778 (holding that '§ 506(d) does not allow petitioner to 'strip down'
strip down home mortgages remains and is one of the most controver-
sial in all of bankruptcy law.' The question has split the circuits;' the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the issue." The Court's
decision will affect not only lending institutions and current homeown-
ers, but potential homeowners and the economy as a whole.!
The authors propose a contextual approach to the question." The
applicable statutory text must remain the centerpiece of any analysis,
but that centerpiece must be placed in the appropriate context: in the
context of other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, in the context of
the typical fact pattern affected by the language, in the context of
unmistakable legislative intent, in the context of the unmistakable
policies of the Code, and in the context of non-bankruptcy and pre-
Code law. With such a commonsense approach, courts can avoid the
"overly technocratic" reading of Acts of Congress as if they were
mathematical puzzles.
Applying a contextual approach, we conclude that in most Chapter 13
cases, the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize home mortgage strip
down. That conclusion and five subsidiary conclusions are summarized
respondents' lien"). See infra notes 228-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Dewnup.
4. See, e.g., Erik D. Ilingenberg, Note, Strip Down of Home Mortgages: Undress.
ing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), 66 ST. JOHN'S L REv. 443 (1992); Patricia Llndauer, Note
& Comment, Optimizing the "Fresh Start": Mortgage Cramdoum Under Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 J.L & CoM. 257 (1992); Alexander L Cataldo, et al., Resi-
dential Mortgage Bifurcation Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 96 COM. Li.
225 (1991); Regina L Nassen, Note, Bankruptcy Code § 1322(b)(2)'. No-Modification
Clause: Who Does It Protect?, 33 ARtz. L REV. 979 (1991); Vincent J. Canzoneri,
'Crumdowns" of Residential Mortgages in Declining Markets: The Perils and Po-
tentials of Chapter 13, 35 BOSTON B.J. 17 (1991); Michael S. Polk, The Chapter 13
Cramdou. New Nightmare for the Lender, 19 REAL EST. LJ. 279 (1991) [hereinafter
Polk, Chapter 13 Cramdoum]; Peter H. Carroll, M, Cramdoum of Residential Mort-
gages in Chapter 13 Cases, 20 COLO. LAW. 881 (1991); Lisa Gayle Minx, Comment,
Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code and Chapters 7 and 13: The Tenth Circuit
Joins the Fray, 5 CONSUMER FIN. L Q. REP. 213 (Spring 1991); Michael S. Polk,
Taming the Bankruptcy Beast, 50 MORTGAGE BANIaNG 33 (Aug. 1990) [hereinafter
Polk, Bankruptcy Beast].
5. See iqfra notes 48-227 and accompanying text for a discussion of the key
circuit cases.
6. Nobleman [sic] v. American Sav. Bank (In. re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483 (5th
Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992) (No. 92-641). The Nobelmans' name was
misspelled in the Fifth Circuit opinion.
7. See infra notes 443-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of these im-
pacts.
8. For a contextual approach limited to the context of the "statutory 'scheme," see
Nassen, supra note 4, at 984-85, 988-89, and 996.
9. In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
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briefly at the end of this introduction. To provide "context" for the
summary, and to set the stage for the remainder of this article, it is
necessary to explain briefly the basics of Chapter 13 and to identify the
key statutory language: the "other than" clause.
B. Chapter 13 Basics
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code" provides a means for individu-
als with regular income" to adjust their debts. The adjustment is
accomplished under a Chapter 13 plan drafted by the debtor or the
debtor's attorney." The plan must provide for a portion of the debtor's
income to be submitted to the bankruptcy trustee'3 over a period
which typically is at least three years but which cannot exceed five
years. If the plan meets the statutory requirements, the court must
confirm it. 5 After the plan is confirmed, the trustee pays the creditors
as directed under the plan, using the funds periodically submitted by
the debtor."
10. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-98, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. I 1990 & Supp. M 1991)). Section
references in the text are to the Bankruptcy Code unless otherwise indicated.
11. The Bankruptcy Code defines an individual with regular income as an 'individ-
ual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make
payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this title, other than a stockbroker or a
commodity broker." 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (Supp. M1 1991). Such an individual may file
a Chapter 13 petition if the individual owes noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured
debts of less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than
$350,000. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988). Such an individual and his or her spouse may
fie. a joint petition if their combined debts do not exceed those limits. Id,
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988) ("The debtor shall file a plan.").
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1988) (stating that the plan shall "provide for the
submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other future income of the
debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution
of the plan").
14. See id § 1322(c) (stating that "the plan may not provide for payments over a
period that is longer than three years unless the court for cause approves a longer
period, but the court may not approve a period that is longer than five years").
Unless the plan provides full payment for unsecured creditors, the plan must provide
that all the debtor's projected disposable income for at least the first three years be
devoted to the plan; otherwise the trustee or any unsecured creditor can block
confirmation of the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1988).
15. Id § 1325.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988). Thus, the creditors are paid out of future earnings
instead of from liquidation of the debtor's nonexempt assets, as in a Chapter 7 bank-
The Chapter 13 plan may modify the rights of holders of unsecured
claims." In fact, many plans provide for little or nothing to be paid on
account of unsecured claims.8
The plan may also modify the rights of most holders of secured
claims. 9 If the plan does modify a secured creditor's rights, the
Bankruptcy Code sets a minimum payment amount; the payments to be
made during the plan must have a present value at least equal to the
lesser of the amount of the debt or the value of the collateral which
secures the debt.' If, for example, the debtor owed a $15,000 debt
secured by an automobile worth $10,000, the debtor would have to pay
$10,000 with interest during the plan on account of the $10,000 secured
claim.2
1
In the case of home mortgages, particularly first mortgages, the
minimum amount that would have to be paid during the plan typically
would be much larger than $10,000. If the debtor owed a $150,000
mortgage on a home worth $100,000, the debtor would have to pay
$100,000 with interest over the three to five years of the plan.' Even if
the Bankruptcy Code permitted the debtor to modify the mortgagee's
rights, most debtors could not afford to pay that much that quickly
because the payments would be too high. If paying $100,000 with
interest within five years were the only way for the debtor to keep the
home, the debtor could not afford to keep it.
Thus, the Code provides an alternative for long-term debts.' The
ruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (1988) (stating that the duty of the trustee in a Chap-
ter 7 case is to 'collect and reduce to money the property of the estate"); 11 U.S.C.
§ 726 (1988) (specifying how the money thus generated should be distributed to
creditors). One of Chapter 13's attractive features is that debtors generally do not
lose their property;, although the Chapter 13 filing creates an estate comprised of the
debtor's property, the debtor remains in possession of the property. 11 U.S.C. §§
541(a), 1306 (1988). Confirmation of the plan revests the property of the estate in the
debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (1988).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
18. See, e.g., Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483,
485 (5th Cr.) (stating that the unsecured creditors would receive nothing under the
plan), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992) (No. 92-641). The unpaid portion of the
claims is discharged (with few exceptions) when the debtor completes payments
under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1988); see infra notes 318-26 and accompanying
text.
21. See infra notes 318-26 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 318-26 and accompanying text.
23. The authors use the term "long-term debts" to refer to claims "on which the
last payment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is
due." See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988). See infra note 141 for the full text of §
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debtor may provide in the plan that any defaults on a long-term debt
will be cured during the plan and that regular payments on the claim
will be maintained.' If that is done, the effects of the default will be
reversed. Thus, reinstatement of a defaulted mortgage will be permitted,
even if it has been accelerated so that, under state law, the entire mort-
gage debt is due and payable.' Using this approach, the regular
monthly mortgage payments, which will usually be based on a fifteen-,
twenty-, or thirty-year amortization schedule, may be low enough for
the debtor to afford, especially given the relief from other debts that
Chapter 13 will provide.
C. The '"ther Than" Clause and the Meaning of "Secured Claims"
There are some holders of secured claims whose rights cannot be
modified. Under § 1322(b)(2) a plan may "modify the rights of holders
of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of
holders of unsecured claims .... "2
It is the meaning of that limitation-the italicized "other than" clause-
that has spawned such intense controversy. Its meaning, and thus the
degree of protection it gives to home mortgagees, depends in part on
the meaning of the two words that precede it: "secured claims."
The meaning of the term "secured claim" as it is used in different
contexts in the Bankruptcy Code is therefore one of the key issues
discussed in this article.' The term has a general and a technical
meaning. In its general sense, "secured claim" means the entire claim
that is, under nonbankruptcy law, secured by a lien on property,
without regard to the property's value.' However, in the technical
sense given by § 506(a),' a debt secured by a lien is considered a
1322(b)(5).
24. Id. § 1322(b)(5).
25. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d
1428 (6th Cir. 1985). The mortgage debt will not be discharged if the plan provides
for it under § 1322(b)(6). 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1) (1988).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
27. See infra notes 350-72 and 400-22 and accompanying text.
28. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), infra notes 264-88 and accompa-
nying text.
29. Section 506(a) provides, in relevant part-
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
"secuied claim" only up to the value of the property which is the
subject of the len.' A key question is which meaning the term bears
in the "other than" clause."
D. Summary of Conclusions
Our major conclusion is that strip down of home mortgages is
impermissible in most Chapter 13 cases. It is permissible only if both of
the following conditions are met: (1) the undersecured mortgagee has
taken other collateral for the loan in addition to the home, so that the
"other than" clause does not apply,' and (2) the Chapter 13 plan does
not utilize § 1322(b)(5)' to cure a mortgage default.
This conclusion follows from five subsidiary conclusions. First,
courts permitting strip down routinely argue that their interpretation of
the "other than" clause provides "special protection" for mortgagees,
consistent with the obvious intent of the "other than" clause.3Y In
several of the key cases this argument is demonstrably incorrect, as it
will be in the typical case.' These courts "strip" so much meaning
from the "other than" clause that their perception of the "plain mean-
ing" of the statutory language cannot be determinative.'
Second, the term "secured claim" is used in its general sense in §
estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property ... and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest..
is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code, including § 506(a), ap-
plies in cases under chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988). However,
that does not necessarily mean that the term "secured claim" carries the § 506(a)
meaning wherever it is used in provisions that apply to such cases. In fact, the Su-
preme Court held in Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992), that it did not even
carry that meaning in § 506(d). See infra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
30. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778. An undersecured creditor's claim is therefore
bifurcated by § 506(a) into a "secured claim" equal in amount to the value of the
collateral and an "unsecured claim" equal in amount to the remainder of the debt. Id.
If the undersecured creditor's lien is junior to one or more other liens on the, same
collateral, the amount of the other liens must first be subtracted from the value of
the collateral before determining the amount of the junior creditor's § 506(a) secured
claim. See infra note 54.
31. See infra notes 350-72 and 400-22 and accompanying text.
32. The "other than" clause applies if the claim is secured "oldy by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence .... " 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
33. Id § 1322(b)(5).
34. See infra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 309-42 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 309-42 and accompanying text.
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1322(b)(2) to mean the entire claim which is, under nonbankruptcy law,
secured by a lien, without regard to the value of the collateral.' Thus
the "other than" clause protects the entire mortgage debt. Accordingly,
strip down is prohibited if the "other than" clause applies.
Third (and independent of the second conclusion), the "rights"
protected from modification by the "other than" clause include the right
to have a lien for the entire mortgage debt, not just for the amount of
the "secured claim" in the technical § 506(a) sense.' Thus again, if the
"other than" clause applies, home mortgage strip down is forbidden.
Fourth, the term "secured claim" is also used in its general sense in §
1322(b)(5), which permits the curing of defaults on long-term debts.'
Most homeowners in Chapter 13 must, as a practical and ultimately a
legal matter, use § 1322(b)(5) to cure their defaulted home mortgages if
they wish to keep their homes.' The use of § 1322(b)(5) is inconsis-
tent with modification of a claim in any way other than by curing
defaults; thus most homeowners in Chapter 13 cannot strip down their
mortgages even if the "other than" clause does not apply."'
Fifth, because homeowners in Chapter 13 typically use § 1322(b)(5),
the preceding conclusion implies that the "other than" clause is less
important than the legislative history suggests.' However, there are
still important cases in which the "other than" clause is the only
provision which prevents strip down.' Further, an interpretation that
creates some overlapping armor in the obviously intended protection
for home lenders should be preferred-even though it creates some
redundancy-over a pro-strip down interpretation that makes the "other
than" clause largely redundant and harms those whom the clause was
intended to protect.
Part II of this article describes the major circuit court decisions
concerning home mortgage strip down in Chapter 13." Part III discuss-
es the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup v.
37. See inifra notes 350-72 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 356-58 and 373-84 and accompanying text.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(6) (1988).
40. See infra notes 310-17 and 402-04 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 400-22 and accompanying text.
42. See infra Section IV.F. following note 422.
43. See infra Section IV.F. following note 422.
44. See infra notes 48-227 and accompanying text.
Timm.' Part IV presents the authors' suggested interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code sections in question. This contextual interpretation
respects the statutory language and makes sense of it in the context of
other Code provisions, in the context of the typical case to which the
language will apply, in the context of Congress' intent, in the context of
the Code's policies, and in the context of the pre-Code law.' Part IV
also criticizes the primary pro-strip down circuit cases, discusses the
policy implications of allowing strip down, and discusses the high
stakes for potential home buyers, the lending industry, and the econo-
my. 4
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II. THE CIRCUIT DECISIONS
A. The Key Pro-Strip Doum Cases
Prior to 1989, no circuit court had decided whether home mortgages
could be stripped down in Chapter 13' despite the existence of the
"other than" clause.' A few lower court decisions had permitted strip
down;' a few others had not.5 In 1989, the Ninth Circuit Court of
45. See infra notes 228-95 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 296-433 and accompanying text.
47. See iqfra notes 296-433 and accompanying text (main section criticizing key
circuit cases) and 434-50 and accompanying text (discussing policy implications).
48. There were, however, dicta that strongly suggested strip down would not be
permitted. See Seidel v. Larson (In re Seidel), 752 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1985);
Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 243-46 (5th Cir. 1984). In 1989,
two opinions from the Third Circuit included dicta suggesting that strip down was
permissible. See Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1311 (3d Cir.
1989), overruted by Dewsnup v. Timm, '112 S. Ct. 773 (1992); In re Lewis, 875 F.2d
53, 57 (3d Cir. 1989) (deciding procedural matter of whether debtor waived right to
seek mortgage strip down and stating that provisions of plan calling for strip down
"were obviously crafted in strict compliance with the Code").
49. The "other than" clause is found in § 1322(b)(2), which provides:
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may-
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
secured only by a security interest in reat property that is the
debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or
leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of claims.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added). The italicized language is the "other
than" clause.
50. In re Kehm, 90 B.R. 117 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Jablonski, 88 B.R. 652
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Simmons, 78 B.R. 300 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In re
Caster, 77 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1P87); In re Bruce, 40 B.R. 884 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1984); In re Morphis, 30 B.R. 589 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Spadel v. Household Con-
sumer Discount (In re Spadel), 28 B.R. 537 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Neal, 10
B.R. 535 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
51. In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988); In re Brown, 91 B.R. 19
(Vol. 20: 425, 1993 Home Mortgage Strip Down in Chapter 13
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Appeals in Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland)"
affirmed the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan which stripped down an
undersecured home mortgage. The court held that the "other than"
clause protected only the mortgagee's § 506(a)' secured claim from
modification."
1. In re Hougland"
The debtors in Hougland financed their purchase of a home with a
loan from Lomas & Nettleton Company (Lomas), secured by a first
mortgage on the home.' The loan was made under an Oregon
veterans' program; under that program the monthly payments initially
were less than the amount needed to pay the interest on the loan."'
Under such a negative amortization scheme, the principal amount of the
loan increases for some time until the later, larger payments begin to
pay it off." After default, Lomas commenced foreclosure proceedings,
and the debtors filed a Chapter 13 petition.' At that time the home
was worth $47,240, but the loan balance was slightly more than $51,000,
leaving Lomas nearly $4000 undersecured.' The debtors' Chapter 13
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); In re Catlin, 81 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); In re
Hemsing, 75 B.R. 689 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246 (Bankr.'
D.NJ. 1986); In re Smith, 63 B.R. 15 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
52. 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
53. See supra note 29 for statutory text of § 506(a).
54. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1185. The amount of an undersecured first mortgagee's
"secured claim," as that term is used in § 506(a), is the value of the home. If the
undersecured mortgagee's lien is junior to one or more other liens, the amount of
the mortgagee's § 506(a) secured claim is equal to the value of the home less the
amount of the senior liens. For example, in In re Govan, 139 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1992), the debtor's home was worth $12,000. Id. at 1019. The balance owing on
the first mortgage was $7450. Id. The balance owing on the second mortgage was
slightly more than $8000. Id. The court explained that the second mortgagee, there-
fore, had a secured claim equal to $4550, the difference between the value of the
property and the amount of the first mortgage. Id, Unfortunately, in our view, the
court then permitted strip down of the second mortgage to the $4550 figure. Id. at
1021.
55. For criticisms of Hougland, see infra notes 300-42 and accompanying text.
56. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1182.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. In re Hougland, 93 B.R. 718, 719 (D. Or. 1988), aWld sub noma. Hougland v.
Lomas & Nettleton Co., 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
60. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1182-83.
plan provided for avoidance of the mortgage lien to the extent of the
undersecured amount."' Lomas contended that stripping down the lien
would be an impermissible modification of its rights in violation of the
"other than" clause in § 1322(b)(2).'
The bankruptcy court denied confirmation of the plan,' but the
district court reversed, holding that the "other than" clause did not
prevent § 506(a) from bifurcating Lomas's claim into secured and
unsecured portions or prevent the lien securing Lomas's resulting §
506(a) unsecured claim from being avoided under § 506(d).' The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court decision but did not rely on §
506(d).-
The Ninth Circuit argued that in this case "the quest for meaning
should begin and end 'with the language of the statute itself.'" The
court pointed out that § 506(a) applied in Chapter 13 cases' and
concluded that there was "no reason to believe that the phrases
'secured claim' and 'unsecured claim' in section 1322(b)(2) have any
meaning other than those given to them by section 506(a). "' Thus,
under the court's plain meaning application of § 506(a), Lomas' claim
had "a 'secured claim' and an 'unsecured claim' component." '
The court then concluded that the "other than" clause only prevents
modification of the § 506(a) secured claim component." The "other
than" clause follows language that refers to secured claims and
precedes language that refers to unsecured claims.' Thus, the court
61. In re Hougland, 93 B.R. at 719.
62. Id. See supra note 49 for the text of § 1322(b)(2), including the "other than"
clause.
63. In re Hougland, 93 B.R. at 720.
64. Id. at 721-22. Section 506(d) provides, in relevant part:
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an
allowed secured claim, such lien is void unless ... such claim was disal-
lowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title ... or ... such
claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity
to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988). Reliance on § 506(d) for strip down should no longer be
possible after the Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773
(1992), discussed iqfra at notes 228-95 and accompanying text. See infra note 106.
65. See Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th
Cir. 1989), affg In re Hougland, 93 B.R. 718 (D. Or. 1988).
66. Id. at 1183 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. 235, 241-
(1989)).
67. See supra note 29.
68. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1183.
69. Id. at 1183-84.
70. Id. at 1184.
71. Id.
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reasoned, 'the clause refers to and limits only the preceding language
which addresses the modification of secured claims-not the subse-
quent language which authorizes modifying the rights of holders of
unsecured claims.' Therefore, only the § 506(a) secured claim was
protected.7' According to the court, § 1322(b)(2) authorizes modifica-
tion of the unsecured claim component of the undersecured
mortgagee's claim.' As a result, the court affirmed the district court's
decision permitting strip down of the mortgage.'
Additionally, the court rejected the argument that affecting the
unsecured portion of the claim would impermissibly "modify the rights"
of a home mortgagee in violation of section '1322(b)(2).' Apparently
the court believed that in addition to bifurcating the claim, § 506(a)
operates to bifurcate an undersecured mortgagee's lien rights. This
means that the modification of the § 506(a) unsecured claim can
eliminate the corresponding lien rights.m Hence, according to the
court, the "other than" clause prevents modification of those lien rights
only if the clause limits modification of the mortgagee's unsecured
claim.m
Further, the court impliedly rejected the argument that the "other
than" clause's use of the broad term "claims"-which by definition
includes both secured and unsecured claimsa-indicates that the plan
can modify neither the mortgagee's § 506(a) secured claim nor its §
506(a) unsecured claim." The court rejected the suggestion that "Con-
gress should have sent the word 'claim' into the 'other than' clause
flanked on each side by the word 'secured'" if Congress wanted to
make it clear that the "other than" clause dealt only with secured
72. I&
73. Id.
74. Id. The court stated that "one would think that most residential real estate
lenders would see to it that they had a sufficient cushion to avoid finding themselves
in an undersecured position." Id. The court also noted approvingly that its interpreta-
tion would "put a crimp" in the "schemes" of those who were not "true" residential
real estate lenders but who merely took a mortgage to gain the benefits of the
"other than" clause. Id. at 1184-85.
75. 1d at 1185.
76. Id. at 1184.
77. Id. (citing In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 705-06 (D.N.D. 1988)).
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (Supp. IM 1991).
81. Hougatnd, 886 F.2d at 1184.
claims.'
Rejecting the suggestion that §§ 506(a) and 1322(b)(2) conflict, the
court held instead that they are harmonious when read in the context
of the whole Bankruptcy Code.' The court also summarily noted that
the legislative history merely showed that Congress intended the "other
than" clause to benefit residential real estate lenders, an intent already
obvious from the clause's language."
Finally, the court rejected the argument that its interpretation would
"severely undermine the statute. "' The court apparently conceded that
its interpretation of the "other than" clause would be "absurd" and,
thus, incorrect if it did not provide "special protection" for the secured
claim component.' As this Article will demonstrate, under the court's
interpretation, the "other than" clause failed to provide any special
protection for Lomas' secured claim.'
2. Wilson
In Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.,'M the Third Circuit
followed Hougland and held that debtors could modify the § 506(a)
unsecured claims of undersecured mortgagees.' Commonwealth's first
mortgage on the Wilsons' home covered "not only the real estate but
also 'any and all appliances, machinery, furniture and equipment
(whether fixtures or not) of any nature whatsoever now or hereafter
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1185. For cases that discuss the legislative history of § 1322(b)(2), see,
e.g., Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 488-89 (5th
Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992) (No. 92-641); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart
(In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1412 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage
Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127-28 (3d Cir. 1990); Federal Land Bank of Louisville v. Glenn
(In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1432-35 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849
(1985); In re Seidel, 752 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1985); Grubbs v. Houston First
Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 239-46 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); In re Harris, 94 B.R.
832, 835-37 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989); In re Foster, 61 B.R. 492, 495 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1986); In re Neal, 10 B.R. 535, 536-37 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
85. Houg/and, 886 F.2d at 1184.
86. See id.
87. See infra notes 350-72 and accompanying text. In Lomas Mortgage USA v.
Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that
home mortgages can be stripped down in Chapter 13 cases. The court held that
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), did not require a different result. Lomas
Mortgage USA, 980 F.2d at 1282.
88. 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
89. Id. at 127.
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installed in or upon said premises."' Commonwealth's proof of claim
asserted that the entire $38,176.75 first mortgage debt was a secured
claim.' As a prelude to stripping down the mortgage, the debtors
sought an order that Commonwealth's allowed secured claim was only
$22,000, the stipulated value of the home, plus the value of the other
collateral.' In opposition, Commonwealth argued that the "other than"
clause "prevent[ed] the Bankruptcy Court from modifying its 'secured
claim' by dividing it into secured and unsecured claims."' The Bank-
ruptcy Court entered the order sought by the debtors, holding that the
"other than" clause did not apply because Commonwealth had taken
the furniture and appliances as collateral in addition to the home.'
The district court affirmed on alternative grounds.' "Under the plain
meaning of § 1322(b)(2)," the "other than" clause protected only the
rights of a creditor whose claim was a "secured claim," and even then
only if the creditor's collateral was limited to the real property that was
the debtor's principal residence.M The court concluded that the term
"secured claim" in § 1322(b)(2) meant "what 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) says it
means, 97 and therefore held that the amount of Commonwealth's
"secured claim" was $22,000 plus the value of the furniture and
appliances;M the rest of the claim was "unsecured" and hence the
"other than" clause did not prevent it from being modified.' Further,
Commonwealth could not claim the protection of the "other than"
clause in any case, because Commonwealth's mortgage extended to
appliances and furniture and was not limited to the real property which
constituted the Wilsons' principal residence." The court noted that
the unsecured claim was "of course, likely not to be paid in full."
0
'
90. 1& at 124.
91. Id
92. Id.
93. Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Wilson), No. Civ.A.89-4203,
1989 WL 89956 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1989) (setting forth the argument that Common-
wealth made in the Bankruptcy Court and "reiterated" in the district court), ,fJd, 895
F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
94. Id,
95. Id
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Ild.
101. Id.
The court of appeals also affirmed, 2 following Hougland and
dictum from one of its recent decisions, later overruled by
Dewsnup.a1 The Third Circuit stated that "the words of the statute are
'the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting' its
meaning."' The court agreed with Hougland that "because the 'other
than' phrase is best read to refer to secured claims, the 'other than'
phrase should be read to limit modification only of that portion of the
claim that is secured.""°' Additionally, the Third Circuit relied on
another of its recent decisions for the proposition that § 506(a) applies
in Chapter 13 cases' and stated that § 506(a) "defines allowed se-
cured and allowed unsecured claims." 7 Allowing bifurcation of the
mortgagee's claim under § 506(a) and modification of the resulting
unsecured claim would make §§ 1322(b)(2) and 506(a) consistent; thus
the more specific provisions of § 1322(b)(2) do not prevent the
application of § 506(a)." Section 1322(b)(2), the court held, "does not
preclude the modification of any 'unsecured' portion of an
undersecured claim.""
The court also considered the legislative history of the "other than"
clause, concluding that, since the final statute was a compromise
between the House"' and Senate,"' home mortgage lenders probably
102. Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
103. Id. at 126-27 (relying on Hougland and on dictum from Gaglia v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1311 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled by Dewsnup v.
Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992)).
104. Id. at 127 (quoting Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945)).
105. Id,
106. Id. at 125 (citing In re Lewis, 875 F.2d 53, 57 (3d Cir. 1989) (deciding proce-
dural matter of whether debtor waived right to seek mortgage strip down and stating
that provisions of plan calling for strip down under § 506(d) "were obviously crafted
in strict compliance with the Code")). It must be noted that reliance on § 506(d) for
home mortgage strip down should no longer be possible after the Supreme Court's
decision in Dewsnup, discussed infra at notes 228-95 and accompanying text. But see
In re Jones, No. 91-20593, 1993 WL 49925 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb, 23, 1993) (holding
that § 506(d) strips down home mortgages in Chapter 13 cases despite Dewsnup).
107. Wilson, 895 F.2d at 125.
108. Id. at 128.
109. Id. at 127.
110. The court stated'that "[t]he house version of section 1322(b)(2) was more fa-
vorable to debtors ... and provided that the plan could modify the rights of holders
of secured or unsecured claims." Id. (citing H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),
reprinted in [Appendix 3] COLLIER ON BANKRurCY, Part III (Lawrence P. King et al.
eds., 15th ed. 1992)).
111. The Senate version of § 1322(b)(2) included an exception for real estate mort-
gages. Id. at 128 (citing S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in [Appendix
3] COWER ON BANKRUPTCY, Part VII (Lawrence P. King et al., eds., 15th ed. 1992)).
The court stated that "[t]he exception was apparently included to protect the home
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did not get all the protection they had wanted. This led the court to
conclude that the legislative history did not preclude strip down."'
However, in its analysis, the Third Circuit quoted a portion of the Bank-
ruptcy Commission Report out of context and thus mistakenly charac-
terized the Commission Report as supportive of home mortgage strip
down."' In fact, the Commission Report supports strip down of liens
on personal property, but not on real property."'
The court also stated that its interpretation of the "other than" clause
of § 1322(b)(2) did not
leave the section without a raison d'etre. Section 1322(b)(2) continues to prevent
modification of the rights of holders of a secured claim secured only by a real
estate interest in the debtor's home, rights that in the absence of the exclusionary
language of the section could be modified under Chapter 13."'
The court did not specify any particular way in which the "other than"
clause might have prevented the Wilsons from modifying
Commonwealth's rights. Perhaps that was because the Wilsons' plan was
not before the court (or because the court ultimately held that the "other
than" clause did not apply to Commonwealth); 6 the authors suggest it
was because under the facts in Wilson, as in the typical case, the "other
than" clause provides no added protection to the home mortgagee if it
does not prevent strip down."'
The court also relied on an alternative ground to permit modification
of Commonwealth's § 506(a) unsecured claim. Because the mortgage
agreement gave Commonwealth a security interest on appliances, ma-
mortgage industry." Id. (citing Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236,
245 & n.13 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Einbnder, Curing Mortgage Defaults Under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, in 1982 Ann. Surv. of Bankruptcy Law 493, 495).
112. Id. at 128. For a further discussion of the legislative history, see iqfra notes
385-9.
113. See Lindauer, supra note 4, at 271 & n.88.
114. Id.
115. Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1990).
116. The Wilsons' plan either had not yet been filed when the district court decided
the case, or the plan was not part of the record on appeal; the district court opinion
indicated that Commonwealth's § 506(a) unsecured claim was "of course, likely not
to be paid in full." Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Wilson), No.
Civ.A.89-4203, 1989 WL 89956 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 1989), offd, 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir.
1990). The district court thus did not know for certain what the Wilsons' plan would
provide; there is no indication the plan was before the Third Circuit, either.
117. See infra notes 305-55 and accompanying text.
chinery, furniture, and equipment,"8 Commonwealth's claim was not
"secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's prin-
cipal residence."" The "other than" clause therefore did not apply to
prevent modification of Commonwealth's rights and thus could not be
the basis for an argument against mortgage strip down."n
Although the actual strip down of Commonwealth's mortgage was not
before the court,2 ' there is little doubt that the court knew strip down
would be the next step and approved of that final result. That is why the
court found important the language in the Bankruptcy Commission Re-
port--language that the court mistakenly interpreted as supporting home
mortgage strip down."
3. Hart
The Tenth Circuit was the next to address the issue of whether the
Code permits strip down of home mortgages. In Eastland Mortgage Co.
v. Hart (In re Hart), the mortgage encumbered the land to which the
debtors' mobile home was attached and various related items of proper-
ty, such as improvements, "stock," fixtures, rents, and mineral rights."2
At the time the Harts filed their Chapter 13 petition, they owed
118. Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128.
119. Id, at 129.
120. Id. In Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Say., 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992), the Third
Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Wilson allowing home mortgage strip down, again
with the alternative holding that the "other than" clause did not apply because the
mortgagee took additional collateral. Id. at 921. The court argued that Dewsnup v.
Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), did not require a different result from that in Wilson,
and thus followed Wilson. Sapos, 967 F.2d at 925. For a discussion of Dewsnup, see
infra notes 228-95 and accompanying text.
121. Only the preliminary step of determining the amount of Commonwealth's §
506(a) secured claim was before the court. Wilson, 895 F.2d at 124.
122. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
123. 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991).
124. Id. at 1411. The security agreement covered the land "together with all the im-
provements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, rights,
appurtenances, rents, royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and profits, water rights
and stock and all fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property." Id. The bank-
ruptcy court held that by including rents, royalties, profits, and stock in the mort-
gage, the mortgagee had taken a lien on items other than the real estate. Hence, it
was not entitled to the protection of the "other than" clause. Id. at 1415-16. The
district court found that the non-realty items did not presently exist and' had no
value. Therefore, the district court concluded that they did not constitute security for
the mortgage. Id. at 1416. However, the court of appeals held that the district court
could not make a finding of fact---at least one not supported by the record--and
then use that finding to contradict the bankruptcy court's conclusions. Thus, the
district court's decision was reversible. Id.
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$55,000.1 The debtor's amended plan listed the mortgage as a $30,000
secured claim' and a $25,000 unsecured claim.'" The plan provided
for the $30,000 § 506(a) secured claim "to be paid in full without adjust-
ment in the interest rate or repayment schedule stated in the loan docu-
ments."'" Over the mortgage holder's objection, the bankruptcy court
approved the plan.'" However, the district court reversed, "holding
modification of the mortgage to be inappropriate, given the protection of
residential mortgagees granted by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). " " °
The Tenth Circuit reversed, stating that the decisions in Hougland and
Wilson "reflect[ed] the plain meaning of section 1322(b)(2),"'"' which
"should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with
the intention of its drafters.'"'32 The court thus held that "an
undersecured mortgage is, for the purposes of the bankruptcy code, two
claims, and only the secured claim is protected by [section]
1322(b)(2). " "1 In a footnote the court made clear that the secured claim
that was protected was the secured claim as defined in § 506(a).' The
court then stated:
[Wle recognize that while bifurcation, in the literal sense, may be a modification
of the mortgage represented in the secured and unsecured claims, bifurcation is
not, of itself, a 'modification' of the secured claim made impermissible by section
1322(b)(2). Indeed, the act of bifurcation recognizes, but does not affect, the se-
cured claim.'
The court did not state how the Harts' plan would treat the mortgagee's
§ 506(a) unsecured claim. However, the court apparently approved treat-
125. Id at 1411.
126. The collateral's stipulated value was $30,000. Id
127. Id,
128. Id. at 1415. Presumably, the court meant that the principal amount of the
Harts' mortgage would be treated as reduced from $55,000 to $30,000, and that the
Harts would have to make their regular payments on the regular schedule until they
had paid off that $30,000 with interest
129. 1d at 1411.
130. Id
131. Id at 1415.
132. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S.
235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571
(1982)).
133. 1d
134. Id at 1415 n.4.
135. Id at 1415.
ing that unsecured claim the same as other unsecured claims, which may
have received nothing under the plan.'
4. Bellamy
Of the four circuits to embrace home mortgage strip down, the Second
Circuit did so with the most comprehensive treatment of the anti-strip
down arguments. In Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In
re Bellamy),' the Bellamys purchased their home with a $133,000 loan
secured by a first mortgage, payable at $1329.79 per month for twenty
years.' Three years later, they were $13,000 in arrears and the mort-
gage debt to Federal Home had risen to $151,340.85. Not surprisingly, the
Bellamys filed a Chapter 13 petition.' The debtors quickly sought to
bifurcate Federal Home's claim under § 506(a) and to void Federal
Home's mortgage lien under § 506(d) to the extent the mortgage debt
exceeded the value of the home." The debtors also sought to reinstate
the defaulted mortgage under § 1322(b)(5)"' with a reduced principal
amount equal to the fair market value of their home."' In addition, the
debtors sought a determination that they were entitled to pay off that re-
duced amount over the original term of the mortgage.' This would
have allowed them to reduce their monthly mortgage payments below
the $1329.79 stated in the loan documents.'" The parties stipulated that
136. The court stated that "[u]nder this plan, payment of only the secured portion
of the debt is not a modification of the creditor's rights under the mortgage, and
thus is allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)." Id. Remarkably, neither the two judge
majority nor the dissenting judge in Hart cited Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup),
908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990), qIJd, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), which a different Tenth
Circuit panel had decided six months before. In Dewsnup, at least in dictum, the
circuit court indicated that home mortgage strip down would not be permitted under
Chapter 13. See id. at 591.
137. 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992).
138. Id, at 178.
139. Id The $151,340.85 was the amount of the claim filed by the mortgagee. Id
140. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 122 B.R. 856,
857 (Bana. D. Conn. 1991), ofj'd, 132 B.R. 810 (D. Conn. 1991), tofd, 962 F.2d 176
(2d Cir. 1992).
141. Section 1322b)(5) provides:
Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may . .. (5) not-
withstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the curing of any
default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case
is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last pay-
ment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1988).
142. In re Bellamy, 122 B.R. at 857 & n.3.
143. Id, at 857.
144. See id.
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the home's value was $127,500 and agreed that the reinstatement-with-re-
duced-payments issue could await later determination.'" The bankrupt-
cy court voided the mortgage lien under § 506(d) to the extent that it ex-
ceeded $127,500;I" the district court affirmed, also relying on §
506(d).' 7
The Second Circuit also affirmed,'" but apparently ignored the
parties' agreement to deal with the reinstatement-with-reduced-payments
issue later. " The question before the court should have been limited to
whether Federal Home's lien could be bifurcated under § 506(a) and
then partially avoided under § 506(d)." According to Dewsnup v.
Timm,"' the lien could not be avoided under § 506(d),"2 and, a fortio-
ri, could not be avoided simply by applying § 506(a);" thus the- court
should have reversed. Even under the pro-strip down approach of
Hougand, it is not § 506(d) which causes strip down to occur;, rather,
the Chapter 13 plan modifies the undersecured mortgagee's § 506(a)
unsecured claim by eliminating the mortgagee's lien." Only a con-
firmed phn could have that effect." No plan had been confirmed in
Bellamy; at least no confirmed plan is mentioned in any of the court
opinions. Thus, Federal Home's lien should not have been partially avoid-
ed, even under a pro-strip down approach. Nonetheless, the Second Cir-
cult affirmed the order that voided part of Federal Homes' lien."
145. Ld. at 857-58 & n.3.
146. Id. at 863.
147. BeUamy, 132 B.R. at 811, 813.
148. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176
(2d Cir. 1992).
149. See id, at 179-80.
150. See In re Bellamy, 122 B.R. at 857 n.3 (stating that the parties agreed not to
have this issue decided).
151. 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
152. See infa notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
153. The'Second Circuit in BeUamy did not rely on § 506(d) and apparently recog-
nized that § 506(a) by itself could not cause strip down. BeUamy, 962 F.2d at 180
('Federal Home is correct in noting that § 506(a) does not itself affect a creditors
right to payment.").
154. See, ag., Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182,
1183 (9th Cir. 1989) (agreeing with the line of cases holding that a debtor's plan is
permitted to modify the undersecured mortgagee's § 506(a) unsecured claim).
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (1988) (providing that provisions of a "confirmed plan"
bind the parties).
156. Bdlkzmy, 962 F.2d at 187.
Bellamy was the first decision on the circuit court level to address
home mortgage strip down after the Supreme Court's Dewsnup deci-
sion.' 7 The court rejected the argument that Dewsnup prevented strip
down under Chapter 13."
Stating that it was following Hougland, Wilson, and Hart, the court
affirmed the strip down of Federal Home's mortgage." The court stat-
ed that § 1322(b)(2) "prohibits modification of a residential mortgage
lender's rights only insofar as the mortgagee holds a secured claim. But
whether-and the extent to which-the mortgagee holds a secured claim
must first be determined according to section 506(a)."'" Therefore, only
the mortgagee's rights with respect to its § 506(a) secured claim are pro-
tected from modification.'' Although the court did not say so explicitly,
the court must have thought that a debtor's plan could, under the author-
ity of § 1322(b)(2), modify the § 506(a) unsecured claim to eliminate the
lien securing it."
The bulk of the opinion dealt with various arguments raised by Feder-
al Home and amici curiae." First, Federal Home argued that strip
down would modify the "rights" of a home mortgage lender in violation
of § 1322(b)(2) because those "rights" are broader than just the
mortgagee's rights to the amount of its § 506(a) secured claim;'" Fed-
eral Home argued that a home mortgagee's "rights" under the mortgage
contract should be protected regardless of the claim's classification.'
The court rejected that argument, stating that it was "directly contrary to
one of the Code's cornerstones, aimed at making a fundamental change
from the Bankruptcy Act, that treatment under the Code turns on wheth-
er a claim is secured or unsecured, not on whether a creditor is secured
or unsecured."" Hence, the court held that "the 'rights' which may not
be modified under § 1322(b)(2) must be defined in terms of the claim,
not with reference to the claimant's status.""
157. See id at 182-84.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 179, 187.
160. Id. at 179 (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 179-81.
162. See supra text acccompanying note 75.
163. See id. at 179-82, 184-87.
164. Id. at 179.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981)).
167. Id. at 180. In a cryptic discussion, the court seemed to assert that even Fed-
eral Home's right to payment with respect to its § 506(a) unsecured claim was not
modified by strip down. See id, The court noted that state law determines the right
to payment but that "the manner in which the right to payment must be satisfied is
fixed by the [Bankruptcy] Code, which accords different treatment to claims depend-
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The BeUamy court next addressed Federal Home's related argument
that the entire claim could not be modified regardless of the extent to
which it was secured." Federal. Home asserted that the "other than"
clause uses the term "claims" rather than "secured claims," and that the
Code's broad definition of a "claim" includes both secured and unse-
cured claims. Accordingly, Federal Home contended that the "other than"
clause protected its entire claim from modification, not merely its §
506(a) secured claim." The court disagreed and, following Hougland
and Wilson, concluded that "[t]he 'other than' clause is most logically
read to refer to those words that precede it: 'secured claims.'"' ° Thus,
the protection of the "other than" clause is limited to the mortgagee's §
506(a) secured claim.'
The court next addressed Federal Home's contention that § 1322(b)(2),
as a specific provision, should take precedence over § 506(a), a general
provision." The court rejected this argument because "statutory provi-
sions should be construed so as to avoid a conflict." The court found no
conflict between these sections." Rather, "the extent to which one
ing on whether they are secured or unsecured." Id. The court recognized that, under
its approach, the mortgagee's § 506(a) unsecured claim would "obviously ...not be
fully satisfied." Id. at 179. Nevertheless, the court concluded that bifurcating Federal
Home's claim (and thus treating the § 506(a) unsecured claim the same as other
unsecured claims) "does not, for purposes of § 1322(b)(2), modify its 'rights,' but
rather simply determines how, under the Code, its right to payment must be satis-
fied." Id at 180. The authors submit that Federal Home's state law right to payment
would not be "satisfied," but would of course be "modified" with respect to any
amount of the § 506(a) unsecured claim that would not be paid. Perhaps the court
meant merely that Federal Home's rights with respect to the amount of its § 506(a)
secured claim were not modified.
168. Id. at 180. Federal Home cited § 101(5)(a) which defines "claim" as any "right
to payment, whether or not such right is .. . secured, or unsecured." Id.
169. ld.
170. Id. (citing Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir.
1990) (following the Ninth Circuit's view that the "other than" clause is best read to
refer to secured claims); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886
F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that the "other than" clause certainly refers to
what precedes it)). Additionally, the court cited Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic
Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc.,
758 F.2d 741, 751 (1st Cir. 1985), for the proposition that "under the rule of the last
antecedent, [a] qualifying phrase applies to what immediately precedes iL" BeUamy,
962 F.2d at 180.
171. Beliamy, 962 F.2d at 181.
172. Id. See infra note 215 for a discussion of why this argument is irrelevant.
173. BeUamy, 962 F.2d 176, 181 (citing Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. v. Railway
holds a secured claim must in the first instance be determined according
to [section] 506(a)."" In the absence of a conflict, the argument that a
specific provision must control a conflicting general provision has no
significance.""
Next, the court considered whether the legislative history of §
1322(b)(2) demonstrated a congressional intent to prevent strip
down." The court pointed out that under Chapter XIII of the old Bank-
ruptcy Act a plan could not affect a claim secured by real estate.'" The
court asserted that "in seeking to promote the 'fresh start' objective of
the bankruptcy law, the House version of [section] 1322(b)(2)" was
designed to allow debtors to provide for the modification of claims of
mortgagees ... ."'7 Due to concern over the effect on the home lending
industry, "the Senate version of [section] 1322(b)(2)"u retained Chapter
xIH's exception for mortgagees... allowing the Chapter 13 plan to
'modify the rights of holders of secured and unsecured claims, except
claims wholly secured by real estate mortgages.'"
8
'
The final version was a compromise" between the House and Senate
versions.'" Because the House version provided no protection and the
Senate version kept the full Chapter XIII protection, a "compromise"
could have fallen anywhere in between. Thus the most that the legisla-
tive history could show is that "[section] 1322(b)(2) was designed to
provide greater protection to home mortgage lenders than other secured
creditors," which was "of course, plain on the face of the statute it-
self.""' The legislative history provided no guidance to the extent of
that greater protection or whether it included a ban on home mortgage
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 510 (1989); United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Tim-
bers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (explaining that statutory
construction is a "holistic endeavor" apparently ambiguous language may be clarified
when viewed in context of statutory scheme as a whole)).
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Aeron Marine Shipping Co. v. United States, 695 F.2d 567, 576 (D.C.
Cir. 1982)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra note 110 for reference to the House version.
179. Beliamy, 962 F.2d at 181.
180. See supra note 111 for reference to the Senate version.
181. Belamy, 962 F.2d at 181 (citing S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5927).
182. See 124 Cong. Rec. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Ed-
wards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6481; 124 Cong. Rec. S17406 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505,
6550.
183. BeUamy, 962 F.2d at 182.
184. Id.
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strip down. ' The court concluded that limiting the "protective scope"
of § 1322(b)(2) "to the value of the property securing the claim cannot
be regarded as in conflict with the legislative history."" In. the court's
view, permitting strip down would still leave the home mortgagee with
greater protection than other secured creditors. The secured claim por-
tion of other undersecured creditors' claims could be modified, but not
the secured claim portion of home mortgagees' claims.87 The court de-
termined that "[t]his accords with the only discernible congressional
purpose-to give additional protection to home mortgage lenders.""
The court was simply wrong-as we demonstrate below"-in stating
that the "other than" clause's interpretation provided any "greater protec-
tion" or "additional protection? for Federal Home's § 506(a) secured
claim.
The court in Bellamy also rejected several additional arguments. First,
it was not convinced that applying § 506(a) to bifurcate Federal Home's
claim was itself a modification prohibited under § 1322(b)(2). Because §
1322(b)(2) protects only bifurcated § 506(a) secured claims from modifi-
cation, the court determined that the bifurcation itself was not a prohib-
ited modification."M Second, the court rejected the argument that a
debtor who seeks to cure and reinstate a defaulted mortgage under §
1322(b)(5) must reinstate the entire mortgage. Instead, the debtor may
reinstate the mortgage "in its stripped-down form" with a reduced princi-
pal amount equal to the § 506(a) secured claim and make the regular
payments until that reduced principal amount is paid off.9' Third, the
185. ld.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir.
1990)).
188. Id. (citing Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1415
(10th Cir. 1991)). The court also noted that the Senate Report on the bankruptcy bill
supports the proposition that "secured. claims" in § 1322(b)(2) means § 506(a) se-
cured claims. BeUamy, 962 F.2d at 183. The Senate Report states:
Throughout the bill, references to secured claims are only to the claim deter-
mined to be secured under this subsection, and not to the full amount of the
creditor's claim. This provision abolishes the use of the terms "secured
creditor' and "unsecured creditor" and substitutes in their places the terms
.secured claim" and "unsecured claim."
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
6854.
189. See supra notes 301-42 and accompanying text.
190. Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 184.
191. Id. at 184-85. However, it should be noted that this approach creates such
court rejected Federal Home's argument that strip down should not be
permitted because it could lead to the absurd result that, among
undersecured creditors, only undersecured home mortgagees would not
be entitled to payments with a full present value equal to the value of
the collateral.' Fourth, the court rejected the contention that permit-
ting strip down would give the debtor an unfair "windfall," the right to
the value of the home's future appreciation, at the mortgagee's ex-
pense.' Fifth, the court was not persuaded that strip down fails to fur-
ther the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start" policy.' Sixth, the court was
not moved by the arguments that if strip down is permitted "available
home mortgage funds will shrink," 5 or that Federal Home should be
exempted from. strip down because of its status as "an instrumentality of
the United States with a statutory mission to increase the availability of resi-
dential mortgages." '"
B. The Key Anti-Strip Down Case: In re Nobelman
After Bellamy, it appeared that Chapter 13 home mortgage strip down
would eventually be generally accepted. Bellamy was the fourth recent
circuit court case to allow strip down;9  no circuit court had held to
the contrary." However, on August 13, 1992, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Nobleman v. American Savings Bank (In re Nobleman),"
complexities that it cannot be correct; debtors who use § 1322(b)(5) cannot strip
down their mortgages. See in(fra notes 300-42 and accompanying text.
192. BeUamy, 962 F.2d at 185-86. For a further discussion of the "present value"
argument, see irfra notes 424-33 and accompanying text.
193. Id. at 186. For a further discission of the "windfall" argument, see infra notes
438-42 and accompanying text.
194. Id. In most cases, strip down perverts the fresh start policy by aiding only
those debtors who can afford to continue paying their regular mortgage payments at
the time of their financial distress. Additionally, strip down provides its only benefit
to them years later, presumably long after their financial distress has ended. For a
further discussion of the fresh start policy, see infra notes 434-36 and accompanying
text.
195. Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 186. See infra notes 447-50 and accompanying text.
196. Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 186.
197. The four cases are: Bellamy v. Federal Home Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy),
962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992), decided on April 21, 1992; Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart
(In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991), decided on January 17, 1991; Wilson v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990) decided on February 9,
1990; and Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th
Cir. 1989), decided on October 4, 1989.
198. There had been dicta to the contrary in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. See su-
pra note 48. Nevertheless, in Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth
Circuit ignored its dicta and permitted strip down.
199. 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1992)
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held that § 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause prohibited bifurcation of
home mortgages under § 506(a).'e
In 1984, the Nobelmans gave American Savings Bank a deed of trust
on their principal residence-a condominium-to secure a loan of
$68,250.Y In 1990, the Nobelmans filed a Chapter 13 petition.' At
that time, the mortgage was in default,' the home was worth
$23,500,1 and the Nobelmans owed American Savings $71,335.04. When
the petition was filed, the monthly mortgage payment was $675.82; the
last payment was due on July 1, 2014.' Under their proposed plan, the
Nobelmans would pay American directly "at the contract rate only up to
the scheduled value of the condominium," and would also pay the
arrearages.' The plan treated the $41,257.66 debt balance as an unse-
cured claim and provided that the unsecured creditors would receive
nothing. 2
7
The bankruptcy court denied confirmation, concluding that "[t]he plan
impermissibly proposes to modify [American Savings'] claim in violation
of § 1322(b)(2). " " The district court affin-med, stating the issue to be
"whether the Nobelmans may bifurcate a claim secured only by a lien on
their principal residence and then modify the unsecured claim without
violating section 1322(b)(2). " "
The court of appeals also affirmed, "finding that the use of 11 U.S.C. §
506 to bifurcate this claim would impermissibly modify the rights of
American Savings Bank under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)."21' The court of-
(No. 92-641). The Fifth Circuit opinion misspelled the Nobelmans' name.
200. Id, at 484.
201. Id.
202. In n? Nobelman, 129 B.R. 98, 99 (N.D. Tex. 1991), affd, 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1992) (No. 92-641).
203. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 485 (noting the existence of arrearages that would be
paid through the plan).
204. The plan valued the home at that amount. Mr. Nobelman's valuation testimony
in support of that value was not controverted. Id.
205. Telephone Interview with Michael J. Schroeder, an attorney at Miller, Davis &
Opper, in Dallas, Tex., representing American Say. Bank (Dec. 31, 1992). The mort-
gage (technically a deed of trust) was a 30-year mortgage with a variable rate of in-
terest. Id,
206. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 485.
207. Id.
208. In re Nobelman, 129 B.R. at 99 (quoting from the bankruptcy court's conclu-
sions of law).
209. Id. at 100.
210. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 484. It must be noted that the issue is not strictly
fered several reasons for its holding." '
First, the court stated that § 1322(b)(2)'s "other than" clause appeared
to conflict with § 506(a). "2 Specifically, applying § 506(a) to bifurcate
American's claim into both a secured claim and an unsecured claim
would allow the plan to modify the unsecured portion. That would ap-
pear to conflict with the "other than" clause's prohibition on modifying
the rights of holders of secured claims secured only by the debtors' prin-
cipal residence."' 2 When two provisions conflict, the more specific provi-
sion should prevail." Thus, the "other than" clause prevails and pre-
whether § 506(a) might be applied to bifurcate the undersecured mortgagee's claim.
Rather, the issue Is whether § 1322(b)(2), or some other provision, authorizes or pro-
hibits the elimination of the lien securing the § 506(a) unsecured claim of an
undersecured mortgagee. The district court's statement of the issue acknowledges that
determining whether the modification is permissible is a key step in the analysis. Per-
haps the Fith Circuit used the term "bifurcation" as shorthand for "bifurcate and
modify the resulting unsecured claim."
211. IdU at 487-89.
212. Id. at 487-88.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 488. For cases that rely on this argument to prohibit strip down, see In
re Mitchell, 125 B.R. 5, 6 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (stating that the better-reasoned cases
are those holding that the specific language of § 1322(b)(2) controls over the general
language of § 506(a)); In re Christiansen, 121 B.R. 63, 64 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)
(explaining that § 1322(b)(2) is an exception to the general code provision of §
606(a)); In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 733, 735 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that § 506(a)
is a provision of general applicability whereas § 1322(b)(2) only applies to Chapter
13 cases); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (concluding that
"It]he application of general concepts is not universal in the scheme of the Code, but
is subject to specific limitation, and even total disregard, in some instances"); In re
Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 160-61 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (stating that "[t]he specific
provisions found in Chapter 13 must be accepted as controlling over the general
provisions of Chapter 1, 3, and 5"); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200, 202 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1989) (explaining that "one principle of statutory construction provides that
where two statutes in the same enactment conflict, the general language of one sec-
tion does not apply or prevail over matters specifically addressed in another sec-
tion"); In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 705 (D.N.D. 1988) (concluding that "the specific
language of § 1322(b)(2) would prevail over the general language of § 506"); In re
Shaffer, 84 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (stating that "[wihile courts have
recognized the general applicability of 11 U.S.C. § 506 in bankruptcy cases, its appli-
cability has been limited where more specific statutory provisions apply"); In re
Catlin, 81 B.R. 522, 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (explaining that to the extent §
1322(b)(2) is inconsistent with and contradictory to Chapter 5 provisions, § 1322(b)(2)
should supersede them); In re Hemsing, 75 B.R. 689, 691-92 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987)
(stating that "regardless of the inclusiveness of the general language of a statute, it
does not apply or prevail over matters specifically dealt with in another part of the
same enactment"); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (concluding
that "[tlhis court accepts the tenet of statutory construction which provides that
regardless of the inclusiveness of the general language of a statute, it does not apply
or prevail over matters specifically dealt with in another part of the same enact-
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vents bifurcation of the home mortgage claim under § 506(a).21 5
Second, the court asserted that the "rights" protected by the "other
than" clause extend beyond the § 506(a) secured claim. The court stated:
[Slection 1322(b)(2) describes Its subject matter as the modification of "the rights
of ho/ders of" claims, not as the modification of claims as such; thus, the section
can properly be read as excepting from its reach modification of "the rights of
ho/ders of... a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is
the debtor's principal residence .... " Therefore, even if the entirety of such a
claim is not a secured claim (as per section 506(a)), the rights of a holder of such
a claim may not be modified under section 1322(b)(2).'
The court's argument rests on the proposition that an undersecured
home mortgagee who has no other collateral holds a § 506(a) secured
claim secured only by the home."7 Since the mortgagee is such a hold-
er, § 1322(b)(2) prohibits modifying the mortgagee's "rights." However,
the protected "rights" are not explicitly limited in § 1322(b)(2) to the
ment"); In re Smith, 63 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (stating that "[h]owever
inclusive may be the general language of the statute, it will not be held to apply or
prevail over matters specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment").
215. Nobleman, 968 F.2d-at 488. One of two assumptions must be implicit in the
court's argument. Either the court assumed that the term "secured claim" bears its
general meaning in § 1322(b)(2) (embracing the entire mortgage debt) and not the
technical § 506(a) meaning, or else the court assumed that the "rights" of the holder
of a § 506(a) secured claim include lien rights with respect to the entire debt. The
court asserted the latter of the assumptions as a completely separate argument. See
id. Hence, the court may have had the first implicit assumption in mind. Although
both assumptions are defensible, they also render unnecessary the court's appeal to
the "specific prevails over general" rule of statutory construction. Under either of
those assumptions, the "other than" clause would bar strip down regardless of wheth-
er § 506(a) applied to bifurcate the mortgagee's claim. Even if § 506(a) could be
used to bifurcate the claim, the bifurcation could not have any effect on the
mortgagee's rights. Although there might be a need to apply § 506(a) in other situa-
tions to determine the amounts of the mortgagee's technical § 506(a) secured and
unsecured claims, the result would not affect the scope of the "other than" clause's
prohibition on modification. For example, if the Chapter 13 debtor decided not to try
to keep the home, § 506(a) bifurcation could be used to determine the amount of
the mortgagee's unsecured claim for purposes of participation in the Chapter 13 plan
while the foreclosure was pending. We believe the practical problems with such an
approach are not as great as Professor Howard suggests. See Margaret Howard,
Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BANKR. L & PRAc. 513, 518 (July-Aug. 1992)
(suggesting practical problems in Chapter 7 context).
216. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 488 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
217. That is, unless senior encumbrances equal or exceed the value of the collater-
al. See supra note 54; see, e.g., Spadel v. Household Consumer Discount Co. (In re
Spadel), 28 B.R. 537, 538-39, 540 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983).
mortgagee's rights regarding the portion of the mortgage debt equal to
the amount of the § 506(a) secured claim. Rather, the mortgagee's pro-
tected "rights" can properly be considered to extend to the entire mort-
gage debt. Because those rights, under nonbankruptcy law, include the
right to have a lien on the home for the entire debt regardless of the
home's value,"" strip down is prohibited whether or not the term "se-
cured claims" in § 1322(b)(2) bears a technical § 506(a) meaning."1'
Further, it appears that the court, in the passage quoted above, may
have suggested a third reason for prohibiting strip down. The court stat-
ed that § 1322(b)(2) can be read as prohibiting "modification of the
rights of holders of... a claim" secured only by the debtor's home.'a
218. Courts have held that other nonbankruptcy rights include the following: the
right to full repayment of the loan; the right to receive the same monthly mortgage
payment provided for in the contract; the right to the same interest rate; and the
right to benefit from appreciation of the property during the bankruptcy. See, e.g., In
re Gianguzzi, 145 B.R. 792, 794 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating "[m]anifestly, the
reduction in interest rate is also an impermissible modification proscribed' under 11
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)*); Etchin v. Star Servs., 128 B.R. 662, 667 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991)
(explaining that one of the rights was the right to benefit from any appreciation
during the bankruptcy); In re Hyden, 112 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990) (ex-
plaining that the size and timing of the installment payment will not be altered; thus,
the scheduled monthly contract payment amount will remain the same); In re
Demoff, 109 B.R. 902, 920 (Bankr. N.D. id. 1989) (same); In re Ross, 107 B.R. 769,
762 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (same); In re Brown, 91 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1988) (concluding that even if the claim were undersecured, the creditor would "still
receive payment in full because the contract cannot be modified"); In re Basteder, 59
B.R. 878 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (concluding that a change in the payment schedule
violated § 1322(b)(2)); In re Rorie, 58 B.R. 162 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (concluding
that a reduction in the interest rate on residential mortgages was not permitted under
§ 1322(b)(2)); In re Ownes, 36 B.R. 661 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 1984) (explaining that a
change in the interest rate improperly modified the mortgagee's claim). But see In re
Diqunzio, 110 B.R. 628, 629 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990) (implying that smaller payments can
be made by stating that debtors are free to modify their Chapter 13 payments to the
secured creditor at least to the extent of the unsecured portion); In re Neal, 10 B.R.
535 (Bankr. D. Ohio 1981) (stating that an alteration of the contractual interest rate
was not a modification).
219. For further discussion of this argument, see infra notes 373-84 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's rejection of this argument in
Belamy, see supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text. For cases that rely on this
argument, see, e.g., In re Barnes, 146 B.R. 854, 855 (Bankr. D. Okla. 1992) (conclud-
ing that § 1322(b)(2) forbids the modification of "the rights of holders of secured
claims" who have a lien secured only by the principal residence); In re Etchin, 128
B.R. 662, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991) (stating that it is the -rights" of the
clalmholder, not the claim, that cannot be modified); In re Hayes, 111 B.R. 924, 925
(Bankr. D. Or. 1990) (explaining that modifying the rights of the claimholder is pro-
hibited); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 253 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (same).
220. The court's ellipsis marks the omission of the section's reference to "secured
Cdalms..
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The court may be suggesting that the word "claim" in the "other than"
clause is not limited in meaning to the "secured claims" referenced ear-
lier in § 1322(b)(2). Thus the "other than" clause could broadly prohibit
modification of "claims"-§ 506(a) secured and unsecured claims--that
are secured under nonbankruptcy law by the debtor's home."
Finally, the court prohibited strip down because the legislative history
showed that Congress did not intend to permit strip down.' The court
noted that the Senate had "receded from its position that no
'modification' was to be permitted of any mortgage secured by real es-
tate" and instead agreed to the "other than" clause.' The Senate in-
sisted on keeping at least this "limited bar" because of the "valuable so-
cial service" performed by home lenders and their need for "special pro-
tection."' The court noted that the House version was favorable to
debtors, allowing modification of the rights of all secured and unsecured
creditors, while the Senate version was favorable to lenders.' Accord-
ing to the legislative leaders, § 1322(b)(2) was a "compromise."a Ac-
cordingly, the court held that its interpretation of § 1322(b)(2) properly
reflects the compromise that was reached and prevents the intended pro-
tection for home mortgagees from being vitiated."
221. The authors submit that the Hougland court is right on this particular point
and the Nobelman court is wrong. The term .claim" in the "other than" clause cannot
reasonably be read to refer to anything except the "secured claims" referenced in the
preceding language in § 1322(b)(2). Thus, the term "claim" in the "other than" clause
should be given the same meaning as the term "secured claims" in the preceding lan-
guage.
222. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 488. The court relied on the legislative history discus-
sion in Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984). Dicta
in Grubbs indicated that strip down should not be permitted. See id. at 246. See
infra notes 385-99 and accompanying text for the authors' analysis of the legislative
history.
223. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 488 (quoting Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n,
730 F.2d 236, 245 (5th Cir. 1984)). The Senate "instead agreed to a provision that
modification was to be barred only as to a claim 'secured only by a security interest
in real property that is the debtor's principal residence.'" Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 488.
For the Senate version of § 1322(b)(2), see S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978),
reprinted in [Appendix 3] COWER ON BANKRUPTCY, Part VII (Lawrence P. King et al.,
eds., 15th ed. 1992)).
224. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 489. The Senate felt this special service warranted spe-
cial protection from modification. Id.
225. Id. For the House version of § 1322(b)(2), see H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977), reprinted in [Appendix 3) COWER ON BANKRurCY, supra note 223, Part I.
226. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 489. See also supra notes 182-83 and accompanying
text.
227. Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 489. The court also relied on Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.
m. THE IMPACT OF DEWSNUP
A. The Dewsnup Decision
On January 15, 1992, the United States Supreme Court held in
Dewsnup v. Timm' that a debtor cannot use § 506(d)' to strip
down a creditor's lien in a Chapter 7 case to the fair market value of the
property subject to that lien.m Although the Dewsnup decision dealt
with a Chapter 7 case and the interplay between § 506(a) and (d), the
decision has found its way into the controversial Chapter 13 arena. Some
bankruptcy judges have come to call Dewsnup "the most distinguished
case" with regard to the Chapter 13 mortgage strip down issue, not be-
cause it is given a place of honor but because so many pro-strip down
courts have distinguished it."' Even so, many courts have, relied on
Dewsnup and refused to permit strip down.'m In fact, some bankruptcy
courts in the Tenth Circuit have held that Dewsnup has, in effect, over-
ruled the Tenth Circuit case Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re
Hart),"' a decision that allowed strip down.' Other courts have re-
lied on Dewsnup to hold that bifurcating undersecured mortgage claims
Ct. 773 (1992), as lending support to its refusal to permit bifurcation. See Nobleman,
968 F.2d at 483.
228. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
229. See supra note 64 for statutory text.
230. Dezwnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
231. We thank the Honorable Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Judge for the United States
Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California, for providing this information and bit
of humor. For cases that have distinguished Dewsnup, see, e.g., Lomas Mortgage USA
v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992); Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Say., 967
F.2d 918, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1992); Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re
Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 182-84 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Jones, 1993 WL 49925 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1993); Union Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Avret (In re Avret), 146 B.R. 47, 49-50
(S.D. Ga. 1992); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Sairz-Dean (In re Sainz-Dean), 142 B.R.
784, 786-87 (D. Colo. 1992); In re Cardinale, 142 B.R. 42, 42-43 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).
232. See, e.g., Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483,
487 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992) (No. 92-641); In re Barnes, 146
BR. 854, 854-55 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992); In re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364, 368 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1992); In re Doss, 143 B.R. 952, 954 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1992); In re Strober,
136 B.R. 614, 618-19 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); Matter of Davidoff, 136 B.R. 567, 569
(Bankr. M.D. FI. 1992).
233. For a discussion of In re Hart, see supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text.
234. In re Barnes, 146 B.R. 854, 855 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992). See Chapter 13
Debtor, Post-Dewsnup, Can't "Camdown Mortgage to Value of Home, BNA BANKR. L
DAiLY, Nov. 24, 1992, at 6 (stating that [tlhe effect of Dewsnup on Chapter 13 cases
has created confusion in the Western District of Oklahoma... as bankruptcy and
district judges have held that bifurcation is both permitted and prohibited post.
Dewsnup").
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is permitted, but strip down cannot follow. Thus, the lien remains on the
property for the unsecured portion of the claim.'
Dewsnup is not determinative. However, its rationale helps to support
the anti-strip down position.
The facts of Dewsnup are unusual. The Dewsnups borrowed $119,000
from the lenders and gave them a deed of trust on two parcels of Utah
farmland as security.m A year later the Dewsnups defaulted on the
loan, but the lenders waited two more years before commencing the
foreclosure process.' The Dewsnups filed two successive Chapter 11
bankruptcy petitions, each of which was dismissed' because the
Dewsnups failed to propose a reorganization plan in a timely manner"
The Dewsnups then filed a Chapter 7 petition in 1984.' The succession
of bankruptcy filings had prevented the lenders from foreclosing." The
trustee did not sell the land in the Chapter 7 case, apparently because it
was worth less than the amount owed the secured lenders. For some
reason the secured lenders apparently did not seek relief from the auto-
matic stay to allow foreclosure, even though they had the right to such
relief.' In 1987, three years after the Dewsnups filed for Chapter 7 liq-
uidation, they filed an adversary proceeding, seeking to strip down the
lenders' mortgage lien to the value of the farmland.'
235. See, e.g., In re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364, 369-70 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that
bifurcation was permissible although lien avoidance was not).
236. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 775 (1992).
237. Id. at 775-76.
238. Id. at 776.
239. Frunan Jacobson & Brian Bentcover, Secured Creditors Benefit from Dewsnup,
NAT'L LJ., May 11, 1992, at 21.
240. Dewsnp, 111 S. Ct. at 776. The Supreme Court noted the unfortunate fact that
at some point Mr. Dewsnup died. Id. at 775. Apparently his death was not the cause
of the initial financial distress, although his illness may have been. Further, his death
did not cause the lenders' two-year forbearance to foreclose. The Tenth Circuit opin-
ion showed that he died after the filing of the Chapter 7 petition. Dewsnup, 908 F.2d
588, 589 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that "Aletha and Lamar Dewsnup filed a Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition in 1984").
241. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776.
242. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1988) (providing for relief from the automatic stay
to permit "act against property" where debtor has no equity in the property and the
property is not necessary to an effective reorganization). The Dewsnups had no
equity in the land, and their bankruptcy case was a Chapter 7 liquidation case, not a
reorganization of any kind. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776.
243. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776.
At that time the Dewsnups owed approximately $120,000 to the lend-
ers, ' but the Utah farmland was worth only $39,000."6 According to
the Dewsnups, strip down was compelled by "the interrelationship of the
security-reducing provision of § 506(a) and the lien-voiding provision of §
506(d)."I Section 506(a) limited the creditors' "allowed secured claim"
to $39,000.? Under § 506(d), the lien on the farmland for the remaining
$81,000 would be void, because to that extent the lien would secure a
claim which was not an "allowed secured claim."'
The bankruptcy court refused to grant this relief. 9 The court "in-
dulged in the assumption that the property had been abandoned by the
trustee pursuant to § 554(a).""O The court reasoned that the abandoned
property "no longer fell within the reach of § 506(a), which applies only
to 'property in which the estate has an interest,' and therefore was not
covered by § 506(d). "" The district court affirmed without an opin-
ion.'
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also affirmed, relying on
the same abandonment theory.'m The Tenth Circuit further asserted
that to allow strip down in Chapter 7 would be to allow homeowners
greater benefits under Chapter 7 than under Chapter 13,m which would
be inconsistent with Congress' preference that debtors use Chapter 13
rather than 7. According to the court, homeowners would do better un-
der Chapter 7 than Chapter 13 because § 1322(b)(2) prevents a Chapter
13 plan from modifying "the rights of secured claim holders where the
claim is secured only by a security interest in real property which is the
debtor's primary residence." ' Thus, at least in dictum, the Tenth Cir-
244. Id. Presumably if no payments had been made since 1979 on the original
$119,000 debt, the debt in 1987 would have grown by accrual of interest to much
more than $120,000. Either the Dewsnups made some payments, or the lenders re-
ceived a substantial dividend in the Chapter 7 case out of other property of the
estate on account of their § 506(a) unsecured claim.
245. Id.
246. Ld. See supm note 29 for the text of § 506 (a) and note 64 for the text of §
5 (d).
247. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
248. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776.
249. Id. (citing Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 87 B.R. 676 (Bankr. D. Utah
1988)).
250. Id. Section 554(a) provides in relevant part. "[a]fter notice and a hearing, the
trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or
that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
251. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 776.
252. Id.
253. Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588, 592-93 (10th Cir. 1990), qffd, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
254. Ld. at 592.
255. Id.
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cuit indicated that home mortgage strip down was not available in Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy.' Moreover, the Tenth Circuit asserted that permit-
ting strip down of real estate mortgages under § 506(d) would sidestep §
722's ' limitation of redemption rights to certain tangible personal
property. Therefore, it would inequitably and unfairly expand debtors'
rights "far beyond what is contemplated in the Code." '
The Supreme Court granted certiorari's to resolve the conflict be-
tween the Tenth Circuit's holding and a contrary holding by the Third
Circuit.as
Over a strong dissent by Justice Scalia," the Supreme Court af-
firmed:'s "[W]e hold that § 506(d) does not allow petitioner to 'strip
down' respondents' lien because respondents' claim is secured by a lien
and has been fully allowed pursuant to § 502."' Justice Blackmun's
256. Whether this was dictum or ratio decidendi, the panel that decided Eastland
Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991), ignored it. Neither
the majority opinion in Hart, which permitted strip down, nor the dissenting opinion,
which argued that strip down rendered the "other than" clause "essentially meaning-
less," id, at 1417 (Brorby, J., dissenting), cited to the earlier Tenth Circuit decision in
Dewsnup. None of the judges from the Dewsnup panel was on the panel that decid-
ed Hart.
257. Section 722 provides:
An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to
redeem under this section, redeem tangible personal property intended pri-
marily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dis-
chargeable consumer debt, if such property is exempted under setton 522 of
this title or has been abandoned under section 554 of this title, by paying the
holder of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder
that is secured by such a lien.
11 U.S.C. § 722 (1988).
258. Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 592.
259. Dewsnup, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991).
260. See Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989),
overruled by Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
261. Dezsnup, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Souter
joined the dissent.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 778. Section 502 provides, in part-
(a) A claim. .. proof of which is filed under section 5601 of this title, is
deemed allowed, unless a party in interest ... objects.
) ... if such objection to a claim is made, the court .. . shall determine
the amount of such claim ... as of the date of the filing of the petition,
and shall allow such claim in such amount except to the extent that-
(1) such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the
majority opinion adopted an argument put forward by the secured credi-
tors' that
the words "allowed secured claim" in § 506(d) need not be read as an indivisible
term of art defined by reference to § 506(a), which by its terms is not a
definitional provision. Rather, the words should be read term-by-term to refer to
any claim that is, first, allowed, and, second, secured.'
The entirety of the lenders' claim, not just the § 506(a) secured compo-
nent, therefore was an "allowed secured claim" within the meaning of
the term in § 506(d) because the lenders' claim was "secured by a lien"
and had been "fully allowed pursuant to § 5 0 2 ."' Thus, the mortgage
could not be stripped down.2'
It is important for our purposes to see how the Supreme Court
reached the unusual conclusion that the same term ("allowed secured
claim") bears a different meaning in two subsections of the same Bank-
ruptcy Code section. The Court found that the Bankruptcy Code was
ambiguous; given that ambiguity, the Court was "not convinced that Con-
gress intended to depart from the pre-Code rule that liens pass through
bankruptcy unaffected."'
debtor, under any applicable agreement or applicable law for a reason
other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured; ...
11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988 & Supp. HI 1991).
264. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct at 778. The majority opinion stated that this was also the
position of the United States as amicus curiae. Id. at 777. Justice Scalla's dissent
pointed out that the United States took a different approach (which Justice Scalia se-
verely criticized). Id. at 781-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia stated, the
United States took the approach that § 506(d) only voids liens to the extent they
secure a claim which is not an allowed secured claim. According to the United
States, the lien of an undersecured mortgagee only secures the mortgagee's claim up
to the value of the collateral, for purposes of § 506. Thus, to the entire extent that
the mortgagee's lien secures the claim for purposes of § 506, it is an allowed secured
claim; there is no extent to which the lien for purposes of § 506 secures a claim
which is not an allowed secured claim, and thus no part of the lien can be voided
under § 506(d). If no part of the lien is avoided, the entire lien, for the entire debt,
passes unaffected through the bankruptcy case.
The msjority apparently misunderstood the thrust of the United States' argument.
The majority assumed that the United States could not simultaneously take the posi-
tion that "a lien only 'secures' the claim in question up to the value of the security,"
for purposes of § 506, and the position that the lien should not be reduced to the
value of the property. Id, at 777 n.2 (citations omitted). The key is that the refusal
to consider the entire claim to be secured by the lien for § 506 purposes is simply,
under the United States' view, a question of bankruptcy terminology which does not
remove the lien rights of the mortgagee. On the contrary, it would prevent strip
down of the mortgage.
265. Id. at 777.
266. Id. at 777-78.
267. Id. at 778.
268. Id.
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Justice Scalia suggested that the majority found ambiguity in § 506(d)
simply because the litigants disagreed over its meaning. ' The majority
opinion could be read that way,'s but the majority probably had in
mind the relation between § 506(d) and § 722." Respondents and the
United States had argued that allowing strip down under § 506(d) would
render the § 722 redemption provision superfluous and its limitations on
redemption ineffective.' As Justice Blackmun described it, the Tenth
Circuit, in the opinion below, also argued that allowing strip down under
§ 506(d) "would be inconsistent with § 722 under which a debtor has a
limited right to redeem certain personal property."r'
Despite Justice Scalia's arguments to the contrary, allowing strip down
under § 506(d) probably would render § 722 superfluous and its limita-
tions ineffective. 4 Thus, the Court correctly considered that the term
269. See id at 781 (Scala, J., dissenting).
270. 'The foregoing recital of the contrasting positions of the respective parties and
their amici demonstrates that § 506 ... and its relationship to other provisions of
the Code do embrace some ambiguities." Id. at 777.
271. See supra note 257 for the text of 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1988).
272. Dewsnmup, 112 S. Ct. at 783-84.
273. 1d. at 776 (citing Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588, 592 (10th Cir. 1990)).
274. If the amount of the lien were stripped down by § 506(d) to the value of the
collateral, how could a secured creditor refuse to accept payment of the amount of
the lien in satisfaction of the lien? Of course, secured creditors sometimes refuse
payment when prepayment would harm them economically, see Trident Center v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988), but in the bankruptcy
context creditors are anxious to accelerate the debt, not to wait for payment. There-
fore, if § 506(d) stripped down liens, it would effectively constitute a redemption
provision applicable to all collateral, real and personal. Section 722 permits the debt-
or to redeem property from liens by paying the amount of the § 506(a) secured
claim, but that redemption right is limited to exempt or abandoned personal property
intended primarily for personal, family, or household use. 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1988). See
supra note 257 for statutory text.
The Third Circuit argued in Gaglia that using § 506(d) to strip down a second
mortgagee's lien was not the equivalent of redemption because the debtors would not
own the property free and clear even if they paid off the stripped-down second lien.
Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989). However, the
concept of redemption is not limited to the redemption of property free and clear of
all liens; it can apply to second liens. Suppose a Chapter 7 debtor owed $3000 to a
bank as first lienholder and $1500 to a finance company as second lienholder on the
debtor's $3200 automobile. The debtor could use § 722 to redeem the car from the
finance company's second lien on payment of $200 cash. Of course, in Dewsnup strip
down under § 506(d) would have allowed Mrs. Dewsnup to redeem the property free
and clear on payment of the amount of the § 506(a) first mortgage secured claim.
See Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 592.
"secured claim" in § 506(d) might have a meaning other than the techni-
cal § 506(a) meaning.
Given the textual ambiguity, the Court was "not convinced that Con-
gress intended to depart from the pre-Code rule that liens pass through
bankruptcy unaffected."' The Court noted that preservation of liens in
bankruptcy was clearly established under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
and that the Court's prior decisions, going all-the way back to Long v.
Bullard"' in 1886, expressed the Court's commitment to that
principle.'m The Court stated that apart from provisions concerning cor-
porate reorganization proceedings under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act,'s "no provision of the pre-Code statute permitted involuntary re-
duction of the amount of a creditor's lien for any reason other than pay-
ment on the debt."s' Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code with a full
understanding of that practice; therefore, the. Court was reluctant to
accept an interpretation of the statute that would effect a major change
in pre-Code practice "that is not the subject of at least some discussion
in the legislative history." ' Thus, the Court concluded that
to attribute to Congress the intention to grant the debtors the broad new remedy
against allowed claims to the extent that they become "unsecured" for purposes
of § 506(a) without the new remedy's being mentioned somewhere in the Code
itself or in the annals of Congress is not plausible, in our view, and is contrary to
basic bankruptcy principles." '
The Court also was concerned that strip down would divert to the debt-
or and away from the mortgagee (to whom it should rightly accrue under
the parties' bargain) any increase during the bankruptcy in the value of
the property.'
It is important to note that the Court prohibited strip down even
though § 506(a) acted to bifurcate the lenders' mortgage claim. Of
course, in Dewsnup itself (and in Chapter 7 cases after Dewsnup) §
506(a) allowed (and continues to allow) bifurcation of an undersecured
mortgagee's claim in order to give the mortgagee a proportional share of
the estate with regard to the § 506(a) unsecured claim.'
275. See Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct at 778.
276. 117 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1886).
277. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778-79.
278. The Court's reference is to 11 U.S.C. § 616(1) and (10) (1976), repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). 11 U.S.C. §
616 was § 216 of the Bankruptcy Act, which was part of Chapter X, the Corporate
Reorganizations chapter of the old Act.
279. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at'779.
280. Id.
281. Id,
282. Id. at 778.
283. The Court in Dewsnup recognized this: "It is true that [the undersecured
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B. The Significance of Dewsnup
The Court stated that it was focusing only upon the case before it, that
hypothetical situations exposed the difficulty of a unified approach to
interpreting the statute, and that those hypothetical situations and cases
with other facts would have to "await their legal resolution on another
day." Thus the court in Dewsnup did not determine whether the "oth-
er than" clause bars home mortgage strip down in Chapter 13 cases or
determine the meaning of the term "secured claims" in § 1322(b)(2).
However, the Court's holding that the term "secured claim" in § 506(d)
bears a general meaning' rather than the technical § 506(a) meaning is
relevant in two ways.
First, the Court's holding should prevent § 506(d) from being used to
strip down mortgages in Chapter 13 cases as well as in Chapter 7 cases.
Justice Scalia was justifiably concerned that the Court's decision gave
the same language two different meanings in the same section, § 50 6 .'
Neither Justice Scalia nor the majority could conceivably countenance
giving the same words in § 506(d) a different meaning depending on the
Chapter under which the debtor filed the bankruptcy petition. The major-
ity "express[ed] no opinion as to whether the words 'allowed secured
claim' have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy
lenholder's] participation in the bankruptcy results in his having the benefit of an
allowed unsecured claim as well as his allowed secured claim, but that does not
strike us as proper recompense for what petitioner proposes by way of elimination of
the remainder of the lien." Id, Commentators have misread the Court's statement to
mean that, since obtaining an allowed unsecured claim is not enough recompense to
make strip down appropriate, the undersecured mortgagee will not have an allowed
unsecured claim. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 215, at 517-18. The Court did not say
that the undersecured mortgagee would not have an allowed unsecured claim for pur-
poses of distribution, but rather that having an allowed unsecured claim simply was
not enough recompense to make strip down appropriate. See In re Dyer, 142 B.R.
364, 368 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (recognizing that the Supreme Court in Dewsnup
"determined that Section 506(a) should still be utilized, with an undersecured creditor
to have a secured and an unsecured claim").
284. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
285. Under the general meaning of the term, a mortgagee's entire claim is a "se-
cured claim" regardless of the value of the property.
286. Dewsnup, 112 S. CL at 780 ("When § 506(d) refers to an 'allowed secured
claim,' it can only be referring to that allowed 'secured claim' so carefully described
two brief subsections earlier.") (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Code,"' 7 but did hold that those words in § 506(d) bore the general
meaning, not the § 506(a) technical meaning.' Therefore, an
undersecured creditor in a Chapter 13 case, for purposes of § 506(d),
holds a secured claim equal in amount to the entire debt. The result is
that to the full extent that the creditor's lien secures the debt under
nonbankruptcy law, it is an "allowed secured claim"; none of it may be
avoided under § 506(d).
The Court's holding is relevant in a second way. If the term "secured
claim" bears the general meaning in § 506(d), then it is at least possible
that it bears that general meaning in § 1322(b)(2).
Thus, for our purposes, there are two important lessons from the
Dewsnup holding: (1) home mortgage strip down (in fact strip down of
any kind of secured claim) in Chapter 13 cannot be based on § 506(d);
and (2) the term "secured claim" does not always bear the technical §
506(a) meaning.' From the Court's reasoning we learn six additional
lessons, for a total of eight: (3) given the deeply ingrained principle that
liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected and unreduced in amount,
liens cannot be stripped down or eliminated absent some specific author-
ity for so doing;' (4) courts should be slow to interpret ambiguous lan-
guage as granting such specific authority, absent such authority under
pre-Code law or any clear legislative history indicating an intent to grant
such authority;"' (5) there was such authority under pre-Code law for
lien strip down in Chapter X corporate reorganization cases, but not in
Chapter XIII cases;' (6) any increase during the bankruptcy proceed-
ing in the value of overencumbered property "rightly accrues" to
undersecured creditors and not to debtors;' (7) application of § 506(a)
to bifurcate an undersecured claim does not necessarily eliminate the
lien which secures the § 506(a) unsecured claim;' and (8) where a par-
ty suggests that Code language has a "plain meaning" which would ren-
der another provision superfluous, the language can be considered am-
biguous, and other meanings should be considered.' With these les-
sons in mind, we turn to a contextual analysis of the "other than" clause
and related sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
287. Id. at 778 n.3 (emphasis added).
288. Id, at 777-78.
289. See infra notes 350-72 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
291. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778-79.
292. Id at 779.
293. See supra text accompanying note 282.
294. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE PROPOSED CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
The "other than" clause' prohibits Chapter 13 plans from modifying
"the rights of holders of claims secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence."' The key question is
what the phrase "rights of holders of claims" means. If it includes the
right to a lien on the home for the entire mortgage debt, then home
mortgage strip down is impermissible.
To determine whether it includes that right, we must place the "other
than" clause in the context of related provisions of the Bankruptcy Code;
in the context of the unmistakable Congressional intent to give special
protection to home mortgage lenders; in the context of the unmistakable
policies of the Bankruptcy Code of preserving and encouraging home
ownership and providing a "fresh start" to needy and deserving debtors;
and in the context of pre-Code law. Placing the "other than" clause in
those contexts helps to show why it does not have the "plain meaning"
that the pro-strip down courts believe it has.
In order to justify placing it in these contexts and to show why we
should not just read the "other than" clause and apply whatever meaning
may seem "plain," we will place the clause in the context of the typical
fact pattern. This approach should dispel a demonstrably incorrect belief
found in the pro-strip down cases: the belief that the "other than" clause
provided special protection for the undersecured mortgagees in those
cases even though strip down was permitted. Anti-strip down courts
have argued that such a belief is incorrect and that allowing strip down
"vitiates" the meaning of the "other than" clause.'e However, the anti-
strip down courts have not clearly explained how seriously the meaning
of the clause is vitiated. It is so seriously vitiated that an unquestioning
acceptance of the interpretation given the clause by the pro-strip down
courts cannot be justified by any appeal to a supposed "plain meaning."
296. The "other than" clause refers to that portion of § 1322(b)(2) which states
"other than a claim secured only by a security in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
297. Ild.
298. See, e.g., Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483,
489 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that its interpretation of the "other than" clause to pro-
hibit strip down was proper, because otherwise the protection of § 1322(b)(2) would
be vitiated), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992) (No. 92-641); see also Klingenberg,
supra note 4, at 465.
A. Wy Allowing Home Mortgage Strip Down Removes Almost All
Meaning from the "Other Than" Clause in the Typical Case
To see how allowing home mortgage strip, down removes almost all
meaning from the "other than" clause in the typical case, we must see
how the related sections of the Bankruptcy Code operate in the typical
Chapter 13 case involving an undersecured home mortgage.' We re-
turn to the facts of Houglandm and Bellamy3" as a basis for the
analysis.
In Hougland, the debtors owed Lomas $51,000 on their mortgage, but
the home was worth only $47,240.' In Bellamy, the debtors owed Feder-
al Home $151,340 on a home worth $127,500." The Ninth Circuit in
Hougland and the Second Circuit in Bellamy permitted the debtors to
modify the mortgagees' § 506(a) unsecured claims of approximately
$4000 and $24,000, respectively, by eliminating the liens securing the
unsecured claims and by paying the unsecured claims off at less than full
value in the plan.'
In each case, the court argued that the "other than" clause provided
special protection for the mortgagee's § 506(a) secured claim.' There-
fore, both courts found that allowing home mortgage strip down did not
vitiate the "other than" clause or severely undermine its purpose.' The
court in Hougland twice made a point of saying that its interpretation of
the "other than" clause gave special protection to the secured claim com-
ponent of the residential real estate lender's claim. °7 Apparently the
court recognized that its interpretation of the "other than" clause would
be absurd if it did not give special protection to Lomas' secured claim
component."
299. The typical case is one in which the debtor is in default on a first mortgage
before the bankruptcy petition is fied, and therefore wishes to cure the default and,
if the mortgage has been accelerated, to de-accelerate the mortgage.
300. For a discussion of Hougland, see supra notes 55-87 and accompanying text
301. For a discussion of Belamy, see supra notes 137-96 and accompanying text.
302. Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1182-83
(9th Cir. 1989).
303. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176,
178 (2d Cir. 1992).
304. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1185; Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 179.
305. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1184; BeUamy, 962 F.2d at 182.
306. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1184; BeUamy, 962 F.2d at 182 (stating that both the
legislative history and the facial meaning of § 1322(b)(2) demonstrate an intent to
provide additional protection to home mortgage lenders and that the court's holding
provided that protection).
307. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1184-85.
308. Id, at 1184.
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To see whether the interpretation of the "other than" clause provided
special protection for the home mortgagees' § 506(a) secured claims in
Hougland and BeUamy, we must determine how the § 506(a) secured
claims were actually treated in those cases. We must then ask whether
the § 506(a) secured claims would have been treated the same way if the
"other than" clause had not existed, or had not applied. If so, the "other
than" clause provided no special protection, and as the Ninth Circuit
conceded, interpreting the "other than" clause so as to allow strip down
would severely undermine the purpose of the clause and would be ab-
surd."
The plan, in BeUamy and, almost certainly, in Hougland did not modi-
fy the mortgagees' § 506(a) secured claims except to provide for curing
of defaults and maintaining of payments under § 1322(b)(5). 0 Under
the courts' analysis, the "other than" clause applied to protect the §
506(a) secured claim from modification. The only exception to the "other
than" clause's prohibition of modification of the secured claims"'
309. Two student notes may contain the kernel of this argument, but the relevant
discussion in the articles is very brief. See Klingenberg, supra note 4, at 464 ("How-
ever, where the debtor elects to cure his default and maintain payments, the holders
of home mortgages are treated identically to other secured creditors under the
majority's interpretation of section 1322(b)(2)."); see also Nassen, supra note 4, at
990. Nassen's article states:
On the other hand, the repayment period of most home loans extends be-
yond the life of a Chapter 13 plan. In such cases, the claim secured by the
debtor's residence is already immune from the 'cramdown' provisions of §
1325(a)(5) and the debtor must simply cure any defaults and maintain pay-
ments during the plan period. If § 1322(b)(2) does not prevent bifurcation un-
der § 506(a), it really does fail to offer creditors any special protection in
such cases.
ld. It is not clear whether Nassen believes the long-term home mortgagee's § 506(a)
claim is immune from cramdown without regard to the "other than" clause because the
debtor could not afford the payments required by a cramdown-which is in fact one of
the keys to the analysis-or because long-term claims in general may only be dealt with
under § 1322(b)(5). The latter belief would be incorrect. See infm note 312.
310. To be precise, the strip down itself may have modified the "rights" of the
mortgagees as holders of § 506(a) secured claims, and thus in a sense may have
modified the § 506(a) secured claims themselves. Beyond any such modification and
the cure permitted under § 1322(b)(5), the plans did not modify the § 506(a) secured
claims.
311. In Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984), the
court permitted cure and reinstatement of a mortgage under § 1322(b)(3) even though
the "other than" clause applied and even though § 1322(b)(5) was not applicable. If
cure is a modification, then Grubbs would constitute a judicial exception to the
would be § 1322(b)(5), which allows the plan to provide for the curing of
defaults within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments during
the plan, "notwithstanding paragraph (2)" of § 1322(b)(5)."' The courts
also held that the plans should be confirmed; thus at most the plans
modified the secured claims by providing for cure of defaults and main-
tenance of payments.
The opinion in Bellamy makes clear that the Bellamys took advantage
of § 1322(b)(5)"3 but did not otherwise modify Federal Home's § 506(a)
secured claim."1 4 With regard to Hougland, neither the Ninth Circuit
"other than" clause. The Fifth Circuit in Grubbs, however, held that cure was not a
modification; thus, the "other than" clause was not violated by permitting cure under
§ 1322(b)(3). However, if it is determined that cure is a modification, as the Tenth
Circuit held in Wade v. Hannon, 968 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 459 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1992) (No. 92-621), the Fifth Circuit should recognize that the
"other than" clause does not permit cure under § 1322(b)(3).
If a mortgagee takes additional collateral for a loan besides the real property
that is the debtor's principal residence, the "other than" clause simply does not apply.
The additional collateral situation is not properly termed an exception to the "other
than" clause.
The court in Hougland stated that the lender, Lomas, did not take additional
collateral. See Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 886 F.2d 1182, 1182 (9th Cir.
1989). Also, there was no suggestion in BeUamy that Federal Home took additional
collateral. The entire analysis in BeUamy proceeded on the assumption that Federal
Home was entitled to whatever protection the "other than" clause might provide.
312. A new bankruptcy treatise suggests that use of § 1322(b)(5) for long-term
debts may be mandatory as a practical matter. The treatise notes that § 1328(a)(1)
excepts from discharge debts "provided for under section 1322(b)(5)." The treatise
then argues that long-term debts are "provided for" by the Bankruptcy Code under §
1322(b)(5) and hence are not dischargeable, whether or not the debtor's plan uses §
1322(b)(5). See 2 DAvID G. EPSTEIN, wr AL, BANKRuPTCY § 9-16, at 663, § 9-18, at 668,
670, 673 (1992) (citing In re Ramirez, 62 B.R. 668 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986); In re
Foster, 61 B.R. 492 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986); In re Hildebran, 54 B.R. 585 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1985)). However, the weight of the authority is to the effect that a long-term
debt is discharged unless it is "provided for" by the debtor's plan by utilization of §
1322(b)(5). The Seventh Circuit so held in a case issued after the treatise was pub-
lished. In re Chappell, No. 91-3116, 1993 WL 5886 (7th Cir. Jan. 14, 1993). Several
other cases agree (at least in dictum) as does Collier on Bankruptcy. See Education
Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Ali, 63 B.R.
591, 593 (Bankr. D. Wis. 1986); In re Akin, 54 B.R. 700, 703 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985);
In re Smith, 8 B.R. 543, 547 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 223, § 1328.01[l][d][ii], at 1328.10. The cases cited in the new treatise hold that
a plan may not modify a long-term debt-other than to cure it under §
1322(b)(5)-and also provide for payments to be made over longer than a five-year
period. In that holding they simply follow § 1322(c), which prohibits plans from
providing for payments to be made over longer than a five-year period. 11 U.S.C. §
1322(c) (1988). (Dicta in Hildebran may, however, support the new treatise's posi-
tion.).
313. BeUamy, 962 F.2d at 184-85.
314. Id. at 185.
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opinion nor the district court opinion expressly states whether the
Houglands used § 1322(b)(5), but, as the following analysis shows, they
almost certainly did.
If the Houglands' plan did not provide for cure and maintenance of
payments, the debtors would have had to pay immediately at least the
arrearages in order to keep their home. If Lomas had already accelerated
the mortgage debt before the debtors filed their petition, the debtors
would have had to pay immediately the entire § 506(a) secured claim of
$47,240. These results follow because the "other than" clause prohibits
modification of the lender's rights, at least with respect to the § 506(a)
secured claim. Lomas' rights included the right to immediate payment of
arrearages, and, if the mortgage had been accelerated, the right to im-
mediate payment of the full $47,240. Absent payment, Lomas had the
nonbankruptcy right to foreclose. If the debtors failed to pay what was
owed, and if the bankruptcy court refused to grant Lomas relief from the
automatic stay ' so as to permit foreclosure, the court would have
been allowing the debtors to modify Lomas' rights in violation of the
"other than" clause.31 Of course, it is very unlikely that the debtors in
Hougland could have afforded to pay immediately the arrearages or the
full $47,240. If they could have afforded it, they would not have filed for
bankruptcy. Thus, to keep their home, the debtors must have provided
for cure of the defaults and maintenance of payments in their plan, pur-
suant to § 1322(b)(5).1 7
Now we must consider how the debtors' plans would have had to treat
the mortgagees' § 506(a) secured claims if the "other than" clause did
not exist or did not apply. If the "other than" clause gave Lomas' and
Federal Home's § 506(a) secured claims special protection, one would
315. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
316. See Western Equities v. Harlan (In re Harlan), 783 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that second mortgagee was entitled to relief from the automatic stay where
debtor's plan was silent as to second mortgage and debtor had failed to make bal-
loon payment due during plan-not granting relief from stay would have resulted in
impermissible modification of second mortgagee's rights in violation of "other than"
clause of § 1322(b)(2)). But see In re Franklin, 126 B.R. 702, 712 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
1991) (stating that even if the "other than" clause applies, arrearages need not be
paid and § 1322(b)(5) need not be invoked to cure defaults if § 506(a) secured claim
will be paid off during plan by making of regular monthly payments).
317. It is thus apparent that homeowners who have defaulted before filing their
Chapter 13 petitions will almost always have to use § 1322(b)(5) to cure the defaults.
See also Canzoneri, supra note 4, at 18. This makes the meaning of § 1322(b)(5)
very important.
assume that the debtors' plans could have modified those claims in some
adverse way beyond curing defaults if the "other than" clause had not
existed or had not appied. It is, however, almost certain that the plans
could not have done so.
If the debtors' plans had modified the mortgagees' § 506(a) secured
claims in any way other than to cure and maintain payments under §
1322(b)(5), the mortgagees would have been entitled to the protection of
§ 1325(a)(5)." 8 This would have been so because the secured claims
would have been "provided for" by the plans." '
Thus, the plans could not have been confirmed unless one of the three
alternative requirements of § 1325(a)(5) were satisfied.' ° Assuming the
mortgagees would not have accepted the plans,"I and assuming the debt-
ors would not have been willing to surrender their homes,' the plans
would have had to satisfy the requirements of § 1325(a)(5)(B).' How-
318. Section 1325(a)(5) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if-with
respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan- (A) the
holder of such claim has accepted the plan; (B)(i) the plan provides that the
holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; and (ii) the value,
as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the
plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such
claim; or (C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such
holder ....
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1988).
319. Section 1325(a)(5) by its terms applies to "each allowed secured claim pro-
vided for by the plan." Id. While there Is some question as to whether the term "pro-
vided for" has a consistent meaning in the various places it is used, the courts have
held that a secured claim is "provided for" and must be treated as required by §
1325(a)(5) if the plan modifies the § 506(a) secured claim in any way other than by
curing defaults. Even Bellamy says as much. The court there noted that secured
-creditors whose § 506(a) secured claims are modified (in a "cramdown" to use the
court's term) must receive payment within five years under § 1325(a)(5)(B). Bellamy
v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 185 (2d Cir.
1992). The court held that the Bellamys did not have to pay off Federal Home's
$127,500 § 506(a) secured claim in five years as required by § 1325(a)(5)(B) because
cure under § 1322(b)(5) is not a modification. Il See Landmark Fin. Servs. v. Hall,
918 F.2d 1150, 1153-54 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that present value requirement of §
1325(a)(5)(B) is 'the means by which the Code compensates secured creditors for
any modification of their rights," but that cure under § 1322(b)(5) is not a modifica-
tion); In re Capps, 836 F.2d 773 (3d Cr. 1987) (stating that § 1325(a)(5)(B) applies
where plan modifies mortgage contract but not where plan effects a cure under §
1322(b)(5)).
320. See supra note 318 for statutory text of § 1325(a)(5).
321. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A) (1988).
322. See id. § 1325(a)(6)(C). The main purpose of the Chapter 13 filings seems to
have been to save the homes.
323. See supra note 318 for statutory text of § 1325(a)(5).
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ever, the debtors almost certainly could not have afforded plans that
complied with § 1325(a)(5)(B). Even if the debtors could have afforded
it, the courts would not, or at least should not, have been willing to con-
firm such plans.
To comply with § 1325(a)(5)(B), the Houglands and Bellamys would
have had to provide in their plans for payment with interest of an
amount equal .to the entire value of their homes, that being the amount
of the § 506(a) secured claims. The entire amount would have had to be
paid during the life of the plan, a period that could not exceed five
years.'s In each case, the monthly payments needed to fund that
amount would have been more than double the amount of the regular
monthly mortgage payments.' The Bellamys would have had to pay an
extra $1500 per month over the amount of their regular mortgage pay-
ments.3
The percentage of homeowners who can afford to more than double
their mortgage payments in order to pay the entire value of a home with
interest over a five-year period must be vanishingly small." Homeown-
324. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988) (stating that "[the plan may not provide for
payments over a period that is longer than three years, unless the court, for cause,
approves a longer period, but the court may not approve a period that is longer than
five years").
325. For example, an ordinary 1296, fixed payment, 30-year mortgage for $50,000
would require monthly payments of $514.31. In Hougland, presumably the debtors'
payments were somewhat lower than those needed under an ordinary mortgage be-
cause of the special veterans program that allowed for negative amortization. Assum-
ing for comparison the same 1296 interest rate, their payments would more than dou-
ble-to $1112.23 per month-if they had to pay off $47,240 over the five-year maxi-
mum term of a plan.
In BeUamy, the monthly payments also would have more than doubled. The
debtors' monthly payment on their 20-year mortgage was $1329.79. BeUamy, 962 F.2d
at 178. From that it may be determined that the interest rate was 10.596. A monthly
payment of $2740 would be required to pay off the $127,500 § 506(a) secured claim
in five years at that rate. This computation assumes that the interest rate (technically
the discount rate) needed to ensure that the mortgagees received present value equal
to the amount of their § 506(a) secured claims would be the same as the contract
rate under the mortgages. Of course, if interest rates had changed substantially since
the mortgages were originated, the interest rate applicable under § 1325(a)(5)(B)
might be higher or lower than the contract rate. Interest rates would have to drop
dramatically- for the thrust of the argument to be incorrect. The monthly payment
under § 1325(a)(5)(B) would likely be much higher than the regular monthly pay-
ments on a long-term mortgage.
326. See supra note 325.
327. We suggest that there is not a high level of consumer demand for five-year,
ers in Chapter 13 who could afford that must be even rarer. In fact, the
court in BeUamy stated that paying the $127,500 claim off in five years
was "most likely an impossible proposition.'
A plan that called for such high payments would not be confirmable
for two reasons. First, as the court in BeUamy noted, such a plan would
not be feasible.' Very few debtors could afford to carry out such a
plan.' Second, even if the debtor could afford the much higher month-
ly payments, the plan would probably fail to satisfy the good faith re-
quirement of § 1325(a)(3)."I By modifying the § 506(a) secured claim so
as to trigger a massive increase in the monthly mortgage payment, the
debtor would be diverting payments away from unsecured claims. As the
following analysis shows, such a diversion violates that spirit (although
not -the letter) of § 1325(b)(1)(B) and would constitute bad faith. If the
holder of an unsecured claim objects to confirmation, then, under §
1325(b)(1)(B), m the plan must provide for the debtor to pay into the
fully amortized first mortgages.
328. BeUamy, 962 F.2d at 185. See also In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614, 623 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("LIke the Strobers, few debtors would have the capacity to pay off
their entire mortgage within a five year period, through regular monthly payments,
even when reduced by bifurcation to the present value of the debtor's residence),
overruled by BeUamy; In re Franklin, 126 B.R. 702, 712 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991)
(describing as "extremely unusual" the situation in which the debtor could afford to
pay the mortgagee's bifurcated § 506(a) secured claim in full over the duration of the
plan). See also Canzoneri, supra note 4, at 18.
329. Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 185 (citing the feasibility requirement in § 1325(a)(6) that
the debtor must be able to make all payments under the plan).
330. If the plan provided for low, feasible monthly payments with a large balloon
payment in five years at the end of the plan, the plan would not be "feasible" and
the court could not confirm it. The court would have no way of knowing whether
the debtor would be able to obtain (through refinancing the home or otherwise)
enough money to make the proposed balloon payment. The court could only specu-
late about possible appreciation of the home and about the debtor's future credit-
worthiness. Thus, the court could not find that "the debtor will be able to make all
payments under the plan and to comply with the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1988)
(emphasis added); see, e.g., In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614, 623 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(stating that "whether such a plan would qualify for confirmation as feasible is most
dubious"), overruled on other grounds by Bellamy; but see In re Foster, 61 B.R. 492
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (suggesting that balloon payment would not render plan
unfeasible).
331. Section 1325(a)(3) provides: "(a) ... the court shall confirm a plan if ... (3)
the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law."
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1988).
332. Section 1325(b)(1) provides, in pertinent part-
If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as
of the effective date of the plan ... (B) the plan provides that all of the
debtor's projected disposable income to be received in the three-year period
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plan all of the debtor's projected disposable income for at least the first
three years.' Disposable income includes anything not "reasonably nec-
essary" for the maintenance and support of the debtor or dependents.'
Debtors are therefore not permitted to live lavishly at the expense of
creditors.
A few courts have gone so far as to refuse to confirm plans unless the
debtors gave up their homes and moved into rental housing. The month-
ly mortgage payments, which the courts considered high, were held not
to be "reasonably necessary" expenses.' Courts should not ordinarily
take such an approach (unless the home is extraordinarily luxurious),
because one of the purposes of Chapter 13 is to allow debtors to retain
their homes.
On the other hand, a decision by the debtor to double the amount of
the mortgage payment is in effect a decision to turn a long-term mort-
gage into a five-year mortgage. Paying off a home mortgage in five years
is a luxury very few people can afford outside of bankruptcy. Every
extra dollar that goes to paying off the mortgage early is a dollar that
could go to pay unsecured claims. The spirit of the § 1325(b)(1)(B) dis-
posable income requirement is violated by a plan under which the debtor
intentionally increases the mortgage payment.
Such a plan would not violate the letter of the disposable income re-
quirement. If a mortgagee's § 506(a) secured claim were modified and
paid off under § 1325(a)(5)(B), the higher mortgage payments would be
made through the plan. The debtor would not pay less to the trustee to
fund the plan because of the higher payments. The money would not be
diverted from the unsecured creditors as a result of the debtor withhold-
ing funds from the trustee to pay an unreasonable expense. Rather, the
money would go to the trustee and then be diverted under the terms of
the plan. Thus, as a technical matter, the plan would not violate the
requirement that all disposable income be devoted to the plan for three
years. However, analogous cases show that the plan would not be con-
firmable tnder the good faith requirement of § 1325(a)(3).
beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be
applied to make payments under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (1988).
333. Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
334. Id. § 1325(b)(2).
335. See In re Kitson, 65 B.R. 615 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Jones, 65 B.R. 462,
467 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
In many cases, Chapter 13 debtors have tried to hold on to luxury
items such as expensive autos and recreational boats on which creditors
held Article 9 security interests. This was attempted by providing in the
plan for payment to the secured creditors pursuant to §
1325(a)(5)(B).r' The better view is that this does not violate the re-
quirement that all projected disposable income be devoted to the plan,
even if the luxury items are not "reasonably necessary." "' The courts
that follow the "better view" recognize that all of the debtor's projected
disposable income goes into the plan. The problem is what happens to
the money under the plan after the trustee receives it. These courts go
on to hold that such plans cannot be confirmed because they fail to sat-
isfy the good faith requirement of § 1325(a)(3).'
Similarly, plans under which debtors would choose to increase sub-
stantially their mortgage payments to the detriment of unsecured credi-
tors should not be confirmed. They would fail to satisfy the good faith
requirement.
It must also be said that if a mortgage is going to be stripped down
anyway, a mortgagee would likely be very pleased if the debtor modified
the § 506(a) secured claim and paid it off with interest over five years
(rather than curing and reinstating the § 506(a) secured portion only).
The interest rates and other terms might be altered, but the mortgagee
would get approximately the same amount of present value that it would
get if the claims were not modified, and the mortgagee would get that
value sooner. Note that under Bellamy, the debtors merely had to pay
the amount of the § 506(a) secured claim at the regular monthly payment
rate and at the original interest rate.' If the debtors in such cases
336. See, e.g., In re Cordes, 147 B.R. 498 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992); In re Gibson, 142
B.R. 879 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992); In re Jernigan, 130 B.R. 879 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1991); In re Jones, 119 B.R. 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990); In re Reyes, 106 B.R. 155
(Bankr. N.D. M. 1989); In re Hedges, 68 B.R. 18 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); In re Rog-
ers, 65 B.R. 1018 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Nkanang, 44 B.R. 955 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1984); In re Moore, 24 B.R. 857 (Bankr. N.D. IMI. 1982); In re Jenkins, 20 B.R.
642 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1982); In re Davidson, 10 B.R. 374 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981);
In re Granger, 7 B.R. 15 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Patterson, 4 B.R. 239 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1980).
337. See, e.g., Cordes, 147 B.R. 498 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992). Other courts ignore the
technicalities and hold that such plans cannot be confirmed because they do not re-
quire. that all the debtor's projected disposable income be devoted to the plan. See,
e.g., In re Gibson, 142 B.R. 879 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992). There have been varying ap-
proaches in the cases, but "the only thing which did not vary in these cases was the
conclusion: in all of them the courts held that the debtors were not properly invok-
ing Chapter 13 remedies when they proposed to subordinate unsecured creditors'
rights to their time-purchase of specific assets which were not essential to a 'fresh
start.'" Cordes, 147 B.R. at 501.
338. See Cordes, 147 B.R. at 505, 507.
339. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176,
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modify the § 506(a) secured claims and pay them off with interest over
five years, the mortgagees will get essentially the same amount of value
over five years instead of over fifteen or twenty. No mortgagee would
prefer to wait for payments from a debtor in bankruptcy whose credit-
worthiness is, to put it charitably, doubtful.
Thus, for practical and legal reasons, neither the Houglands nor the
Bellamys could have modified their mortgagees' § 506(a) secured claims,
even if the "other than" clause did not exist. They could not have afford-
ed to modify the claims. Even if they could have afforded to modify the
claims, they would not have been permitted to do so, as it would have
triggered a doubling of their home mortgage payments at the expense of
the unsecured creditors. If they could have afforded it and had proposed
to do it, the mortgagees with their stripped-down mortgages would have
been very pleased to have them do it. If the "other than" clause in such a
case did not prevent strip down, but did prevent the debtors from in-
creasing the monthly payments to pay off the stripped-down mortgage
over five years, the clause's only effect would be to harm the mortgagees
rather than to protect them.'
As a result, the Second and Ninth Circuits are thus simply and demon-
strably wrong when they state that their interpretation of the "other
than" clause provided any special protection for the mortgagees. It did
not, and it will not in the vast majority of cases involving first mortgages,
which are the mainstay of the home lending industry." By the
184 (2d Cir. 1992).
340. In fact, at least under one view, the mortgagees in Bellamy and Hougland
would be better off if the "other than" clause did not exist. The Eleventh Circuit
relies on the "other than" clause to deny interest to home mortgagees on arrearages
that are paid under the cure provisions of § 1322(b)(5); supposedly, to require pay-
ment of interest when the mortgage does not require it would be to impermissibly
modify the rights of the mortgagee in violation of the "other than" clause. Foster
Mortgage Corp. v. Terry (In re Terry), 780 F.2d 894, 897 (lth Cir. 1985); see
BeUamy, 962 F.2d at 185-86 (rejecting argument that this led to an absurd result).
Thus, if the "other than" clause does not prevent strip down, its only practical effect
in the typical case may be to harm the mortgagee.
The Ninth, Fourth, and Third Circuits have also refused to require payment of
such interest, though without relying on the "other than" clause. See Shearson
Lehman Mortgage Corp. v. Laguna (In re Laguna), 944 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991);
Landmark Fin. Servs. v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150 (4th Cir. 1990); Appeal of Capps, 836
F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1987). The Tenth and Sixth Circuits have held that interest must be
paid. See Wade v. Hannon, 968 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
459 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1992) (No. 92-621); Cardinal Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Colegrove
(In re Colegrove), 771 F.2d 119 (6th Cr. 1985).
341. The authors concede that there are three cases in which debtors might be able
Hougland court's own standard, its interpretation of the "other than"
clause is absurd and must be rejected.'
to modify the § 506(a) secured claim of an undersecured mortgagee if the "other
than" clause did not exist or did not apply. First, if the mortgage carried a very high
rate of interest, the plan could modify it to reduce the interest rate to a fair market
rate. At that lower rate of interest, the debtor might be able to pay the § 506(a)
secured claim off in five years without substantially increasing the monthly payments.
A second scenario would arise if the mortgagee were extremely undersecured. An
example would be when a first mortgage exhausts nearly the entire value of a home,
and a second mortgagee thus has a very small § 506(a) secured claim. The second
mortgagee's small secured claim might be paid off over five years without increasing
the monthly payments. Third, if the mortgage has only a few years to run-for exam-
ple, six-it might not take a larger monthly payment to pay off the stripped-down
mortgage in five years.
The curious point about all of these examples is that none of them exemplifies
the typical long-term purchase money first mortgage case. The courts seem to agree
that It is in such cases that Congress intended most clearly to provide protection to
mortgagees. Some courts have held that first mortgagees (or at least purchase money
mortgagees) are not only the most important creditors Congress sought to protect
with the "other than" clause, but the only ones. See Cataldo, supra note 4, at 227
(citing cases on both sides of the issue of whether the "other than" clause's
protections are limited to purchase money first mortgagees). Such an implied limita-
tion, which is not found in the text or in the interrelation of the various Code sec-
tions, should be rejected, just as the Supreme Court in Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S.
Ct. 527 (1991), rejected the argument that the protections of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)
were impliedly limited to holders of short-term debts. (11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) protects
recipients of ordinary course payments on ordinary course debts from having to
disgorge those payments as preferences.) Nevertheless, in terms of protecting home
lenders who serve an important social purpose, first mortgagees were probably upper-
most in Congress' thinking. See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d
.236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that the "other than" clause was apparently enacted
to provide special protection to home lenders, who perform "a valuable social service
through their loans"); see also Nassen, supra note 4, at 1003-04.
Thus, if home mortgage strip down is permitted, the "other than" clause will
have significant meaning (by preventing modification of secured claims) only in the
marginal cases about which Congress may have cared little.
It is true that there are rare cases in which a home depreciates so greatly that
even a first mortgagee's § 506(a) secured claim could be paid off in less than five
years. In fact, Nobelman is such a case. The $23,500 § 506(a) secured claim in
Nobelman could be paid off at the $675.82 monthly payment amount at 11.5% interest
in less than four years. See iqfra notes 408-09 and accompanying text. Presumably
Congress did not design the "other than" clause to provide significant protection only
in cases in which there had been such a massive decline in property values. Note
that the value of the home in Nobelman was less than one third the amount of the
first mortgage. See supra text accompanying note 204.
342. The Hougland court also cannot escape criticism for its assumption that "true
residential real estate lenders" will see to it that they are not in an undersecured po-
sition and thus will not be harmed if mortgage strip down is permitted. Hougland v.
Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989). It
would be hard to devise a better formula for ensuring that potential home buyers
who can afford only a 5% or 1096 down payment are frozen out of the "true residen-
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A brief observation concerning Wilson,' Hart,' and Sapos' may
make the point even more clear. In each of those cases, the courts held
that the "other than" clause did not prevent home mortgage strip down.
They also held that whether the "other than" clause prevents strip down
or not, the mortgages could be stripped down because the mortgagees
did not qualify for protection under the "other than" clause.' Each of
the mortgagees had supposedly taken collateral in addition to the home,
and thus did not qualify for the protection given by the "other than"
clause to secured claim holders "secured only by a security interest in
real property that is the debtor's principal residence." 7 The critical
point is that in each of those cases nothing except the possible ban on
strip down--which the courts rejected--turned on the question of wheth-
* er the "other than" clause applied. Even if the "other than" clause had
applied, it would have made no difference. Unless we assume that the
debtors in all three cases voluntarily complied with the "other than"
clause, it would seem that something should have turned on whether or
not the "other than" clause applied. Nothing did. Even if it had applied,
the "other than" clause would have added nothing, under the courts'
view that it does not prevent strip down.
One of the lessons of Dewsnup v. Timm' is that if a party claimed
that the plain meaning of the "other than" clause permitted home mort-
gage strip down, and if that result rendered another provision superflu-
ous, it could be concluded that the "other than" clause was ambigu-
ous.' A fortiori, because the supposed "plain meaning" interpretation
tial real estate lending" market The court also failed to understand how quickly an
oversecured mortgage can become an undersecured mortgage if the homeowner stops
making payments. For example, on a $100,060 mortgage carrying a 1296 interest rate,
the mortgage debt would increase $1000 per month due to accruing interest. Perhaps
the court believes that "true residential real estate lenders" should be quick to fore-
close; if they are not quick, they may rapidly end up undersecured and subject to
strip down under Hougland. See Klingenberg, supra note 4, at 464-65; see also
Cataldo, supra note 4, at 237.
343. 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990). See supra notes 88-122 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Wilson.
344. 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991). See supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Hart.
345. 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992). See supra note 120.
346. See supra notes 120 and 124.
347. -11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
348. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992). See supra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
349. See supra text accompanying note 295.
of the "other than" clause, permitting strip down, renders the clause
itself largely meaningless in the typical case, the clause should be seen
as ambiguous, and other meanings should be considered. Therefore,
other possible meanings of the "other than" clause should be considered
besides the supposed plain meaning interpretation that the clause pro-
tects only the § 506(a) secured claim of undersecured home mortgagees.
B. The Meaning of the Term "Secured Claims" in § 1322(b)(2)
The initial question must be what the term "claim" means in the "other
than" clause. Hougland and the other pro-strip down cases correctly
argue that the "other than" clause refers to the preceding language in §
1322(b)(2), the language that permits modification of the rights of hold-
ers of secured claims generally.m Thus, in the context of the rest of §
1322(b)(2), the "claims" to which the "other than" clause refers are "se-
cured claims." " That is only the beginning of the analysis, however.
One of the lessons of Dewsnup v. Timmm is that the term "secured
claim" does not always bear the technical § 506(a) meaning.m Rather, it
has at least two possible meanings.
The term "secured claims" in § 1322(b)(2) may thus bear the general
meaning which the Court in Dewsnup gave to the term "secured claim"
in § 506(d).' If so, it includes the entire mortgage debt, not just the §
506(a) secured portion. The rights that cannot be modified under the
"other than" clause would then include the nonbankruptcy rightsm of
the undersecured mortgagee with regard to the entire debt. Strip down
would modify those rights by taking away the lien for a portion of the
debt; thus strip down would be prohibited.
We must therefore ask which meaning the term "secured claims" bears
in § 1322(b)(2), the general meaning or the technical § 506(a) meaning.
Initially it may be helpful to see that § 1322(b)(2) speaks of the "rights"
of holders of "secured claims."m There is a separate issue as to wheth-
er the term "rights" may be broad enough to prevent strip down even if
the term "secured claims" in § 1322(b)(2) is given a technical § 506(a)
350. Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th
Cir. 1989); Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d
176, 180 (2d Cir. 1992); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127
(3d Cir. 1990).
351. "Secured claims" precedes the "other than" clause. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)
(1988); see supra note 49 for statutory text.
352. 112 S. Ct 773 (1992).
353. See supra text accompanying note 289.
354. See supra text accompanying note 288.
355. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
356. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
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meaning. It is also true, however, that the use of the term "rights" helps
us to understand what the term "secured claims" may mean.
The "rights" which § 1322(b)(2) may allow a plan to modify obviously
cannot be the rights that bankruptcy law gives a holder of a claim. It
would make no sense to say that the rights that bankruptcy law gives to
the holder may themselves be modified in the bankruptcy case. Thus, the
section must refer to the rights which the holder of the claim has under
nonbankruptcy law. 7 Under § 1322(b)(2), the Chapter 13 plan may
modify those rights, except of course in the case of a secured claim se-
cured only by the debtor's principal residence. If the term "rights" refers
to nonbankruptcy rights, it would not be unreasonable to ask whether
the term "secured claims" refers to secured claims in the general sense,
the sense which the term bears outside bankruptcy. Further, under
nonbankruptcy law, undersecured mortgagees do not have two separate
claims or cleanly separated rights with regard to the value of the collat-
eral and with regard to the amount of the debt in excess of that val-
ue.' It would be peculiar for Congress to refer to the nonbankruptcy
rights of a creditor with respect to a separate § 506(a) secured claim
when the creditor has no such separate claim or separate rights under
nonbankruptcy law.
The above analysis of the flawed reasoning in both Hougland and
BeUamy ' also shows that giving a technical § 506(a) meaning to the
term "secured claims" in the "other than" clause leads to absurd results.
It drains the "other than" clause of almost all meaning in the typical case
in which Congress must have intended it to have an effect.' ° The ab-
surdity of Hougland and BeUamy can be avoided if the term "secured
claims" in § 1322(b)(2) carries its general meaning rather than the §
506(a) meaning.
357. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
358. For example, under nonbankruptcy law the mortgagee can bid its entire debt
at the foreclosure sale and then hold the property to gain the benefit of future apprecia-
tion. Even in bankruptcy that right is respected when property is sold. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(k) (1988). Under nonbankruptcy law, the debtor cannot redeem the property
from the mortgage lien by paying the value of the property. At least in Chapter 7,
bankruptcy law respects that right as well, except where § 722 explicitly permits
such redemption. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), discussed supra at
notes 228-95 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 300-42 and accompanying text.
360. At least that is true if giving "secured claims" a § 506(a). meaning leads to
strip down of home mortgages.
In fact, the terms "secured claims" and "unsecured claims" are used in
a different context in § 1322(b)(2) than in many other sections in which
they appear. In § 1322(b)(2) they are used to identify persons'i-those
who hold "secured claims" or "unsecured claims." The section then re-
fers to the prebankruptcy or nonbankruptcy rights of those persons, not
to their rights under bankruptcy law as holders of secured or unsecured
claims.
Sections such as §§ 722,' 1325(a)(4),' and 1325(a)(5)' refer to
secured and unsecured claims for an entirely different reason: to specify
the treatment of the claim or of its holder-based specifically upon either
the secured or unsecured claim's amount.' Sections that deal with the
361. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988) (stating that the plan may "modify the rights
of holders of secured claims . . . or of holders of unsecured claims"). The Second
Circuit in Belamy argued that one of the Bankruptcy Code's "cornerstones" is the
principal that treatment of claims "turs on whether a claim is secured or unsecured,
not on whether a creditor is secured or unsecured." Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d at 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1992). That is correct
insofar as many sections of the Code refer to the amount of a creditor's secured or
unsecured claim and provide treatment based on that amount. However, § 1322(b)(2)
refers to "holders," meaning creditors themselves, and does not require a determina-
tion of any amount of secured or unsecured claim.
362. See, supra note 257 for statutory text. The Chapter 7 redemption provision, §
722, explicitly demands an answer to the question, "What is the amount of the se-
cured claim?" Section 722 permits redemption of certain personal property on pay-
ment of "the amount of the allowed secured claim." 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1988). Thus the
term "secured claim" in it bears the § 506(a) meaning. There is another compelling
reason for believing that it bears that meaning. Otherwise, § 722 would be superflu-
ous; it would state the obvious proposition that a debtor who paid the entire debt
secured by an item would have paid off the lien.
363. Section 1325(a)(4) provides:
(a) (T]he court shall confirm a plan if-
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim
is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the
estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on
such date.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1988). The reference to the amount that would be paid on the
unsecured claim in a Chapter 7 liquidation is necessarily a reference to the amount of
the unsecured claim, because distributions in Chapter 7 are made to unsecured
creditors on a pro rata basis. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988). A creditor's pro rata share
would depend on the amount of the creditor's unsecured claim as compared to the
total amount of unsecured claims of equal priority.
384. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (1988) (requiring value of distributions on account of
allowed secured claim to be "not less than the allowed amount of such claim") (em-
phasis added). See supra note 325 for the statutory text.
365. An example of a section that determines the claimholder's, treatment depending
upon the claim's amount is § 1126(c), which allocates voting power in Chapter 11
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treatment of claims based specifically on the amount of the secured or
unsecured claims ask the questions to which § 506(a) provides answers:
What is the amount of the secured claim? What is the amount of the
unsecured claim? When an undersecured creditor is involved, § 506(a)
must be invoked with regard to such sections to determine the answers
to those questions.
It is not apparent that the terms "secured claims" and "unsecured
claims" need be given a technical § 506(a) meaning in sections such as §
1322(b)(2) which are not specifically based on the amount of any se-
cured or unsecured claim. Such a distinction, between sections which
specifically require the court to determine the amount of secured or
unsecured claims and those which do not, is consistent with the Court's
decision in Dewsnup v. Timm.' In Dewsnup, the court concluded that
the term 'allowed secured claim" did not bear the technical § 506(a)
meaning.' As the Court interpreted § 506(d), it does not specifically
require a determination of the amount of the secured or unsecured claim
a creditor may have. It merely requires a determination of the extent to
which the creditor has a lien pursuant to nonbankruptcy law and the
extent to which the creditor has an allowed claim, regardless of how
much of that allowed claim might be characterized as "secured" or "un-
secured" under § 506(a)."
cases based in part on the amount of each creditor's claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)
(1988).
366. 112 S. CL 773 (1992).
367. Dewsuup, 112 S. Ct. at 778.
368. See a4. Of course, if a claim secured by a lien were partially disallowed be-
cause it 'exceeded a statutory limit on the claim's amount or for some other reason,
then In order to apply § 506(d) as interpreted by the Court, the amount that was
disallowed would need to be known. (For example, if a landlord took an Article 9
security interest in a tenant's personal property to secure all obligations under the
lease, the landlord's claim would be disallowed to the extent it exceeded the limit
Imposed by § 502(b)(6). To that extent, the lien would also be voided under §
506(d).) However, the amount of any "secured" or "unsecured" claim would not need
to be known to apply § 506(d), but merely the total amount of the claim and the
amount of it that was disallowed.
It may be argued that the first 12 words of § 506(d), "[T]o the extent that a
lien secures a claim against the debtor . . . " specifically refer to the amount of a
secured claim. However, this amount is the amount of the lien under nonbankruptcy
law, not the amount of the § 506(a) secured claim. The United States, as amicus
curiae, argued that the language referred to the amoint of the § 506(a) secured
claim; the majority misunderstood this argument and did not adopt it. Also, Justice
Scalla rejected it in his dissent. See supra note 264. Thus, these 12 words do not
explicitly deal with the amount of the "allowed secured claim" referred to later in §
There are other similarities between § 1322(b)(2) and § 506(d). Each
deals with liens but not in the context of a specified distribution to cred-
itors.' In each case, a part of the Code would be vitiated if the term
"secured claim" were given a technical § 506(a) meaning. In the case of §
506(d), § 722 would be vitiated; in the case of § 1322(b)(2), its own "oth-
er than" clause would be vitiated. In each case, applying a technical §
506(a) meaning would lead to a major reversal of pre-Code law which
protected liens from being stripped down in bankruptcy.' The Court
508d).
Justice Scala certainly argued that the amount of the allowed secured claim
should be compared to the amount of the lien, with the lien voided to the extent its
amount exceeds the amount of the allowed secured claim. The point, however, is
that the majority did not accept this approach. As interpreted by the majority in
Dewsnup, § 508(d) does not deal with amounts of secured or unsecured claims and
hence does not ask the questions that § 506(a) is designed to answer. It is consistent
with Dewunup to read other sections, which plainly do not refer to amounts of
secured or unsecured claims, as not requiring reference to § 506(a).
Such an approach would provide a helpful test that would ensure that courts
interpret the term "secured claim" in sections like 722 and 1325(a)(5)(B) as referring
to the § 506(a) secured claim. It would help to ensure that the "parade of horribles"
suggested by commentators who disagreed with Dewsnup remain purely imaginary.
See, e.g., Howard, supra note 215.
369. The Second Circuit in Bellamy suggested that § 1322(b)(2) deals with claims
while § 506(d) deals with liens. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re
Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 1992). In fact, each section deals with both
claims and liens. The pro-strip down courts, including Bellamy, use § 1322(b)(2) to
eliminate the lien that secures the § 506(a) unsecured claim of an undersecured
mortgagee. But see In re Jones, No. 91-20593, 1993 WL 49925 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Feb.
23, 1993) (relying, in the alternative, on §§ 506(d) and 1325(a)(5)(B), not on §
1322(b)(2), for strip down authorization). The "rights" of holders of secured claims
referenced in § 1322(b)(2) must of course include lien rights. By the same token, §
506(d) deals with claims as well as liens-by its express language it requires voiding
liens (with two express exceptions) where the claims that they secured have been
disallowed. The key point is that each section deals with liens, and neither one deals
with distributions.
370. See supra text accompanying note 268. The Second Circuit in Bellamy asserted
that such a change in Chapter 13 home mortgage cases would be consistent with
Dewsnup because "the Code expressly contemplates that a Chapter 13 debtor's plan
of reorganization may today, contrary to pre-Code practice, deal with creditors whose
claims are secured by real property" and therefore, applying § 506(a) "furthers
Congress' scheme under Chapter 13." Belamy, 962 F.2d at 183-84. However, pre-Code
law did allow Chapter XIII debtors-though technically not their plans-to affect the
rights of real estate mortgagees. Pre-Code law permitted debtors to cure defaults and
to maintain payments on real estate mortgages; if the debtor did so, the referee or
bankruptcy judge would not permit the mortgagee to foreclose. Thus, by the time the
Chapter XIII plan would be completed, the default would be cured and the debtor
could continue to enjoy the property. Clearly, the Code contemplates that Chapter 13
debtors can do more with respect to real estate mortgages other than home mortgag-
es than Chapter XIII debtors could do; if the "other than" clause does not apply and
[VoL 20: 425, 1993] Home Mortgage Strip Down in Chapter 13
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
held in Dewsnup that the term "secured claim" in § 506(d) possessed the
general meaning, not the technical § 506(a) meaning," even though §
506(d) appears only three subsections after § 506(a).' It would certain-
ly be consistent with Dewsnup to interpret the term "secured claims" as
used in § 1322(b)(2) to include the entire debt held by undersecured
mortgagees.
C. The Meaning of the Term "Rights" in § 1322(b)(2)
As noted above, there is a separate issue as to whether the term
"rights" may be broad enough to prevent strip down even if the term
"secured claims" in § 1322(b)(2) is given a technical §'506(a) mean-
ing.' As also noted above, the term "rights" obviously must refer to the
nonbankruptcy rights of the holder of the secured claim. It would make
no sense to say that the rights that bankruptcy law gives to the holder of
a secured claim may themselves be modified in the bankruptcy case.'
Under nonbankruptcy law, the debtor may not satisfy the mortgage
lien on the home simply by paying an amount equal to the value of the
home. The debtor must pay the entire mortgage debt to satisfy the lien.
There is one indissoluble lien securing the entire debt, no matter what
the value of the home. -That one indissoluble lien is part of the rights of
the undersecured mortgagee,'a who holds a secured claim. It would not
be unreasonable to think that "the rights of the holder of a secured
the debtor can feasibly and in good faith pay off the mortgagee's § 506(a) secured
claim with interest, a mortgage other than a home mortgage can be stripped down. It
is not at all clear, however, that Congress intended to make such a major change
with respect to home mortgages. As argued below, it appears that Congress intended
to retain and codify the pre-Code practice with respect to home mortgages. See infra
notes 385-99; see also Klingenberg, supra note 4, at 467. Thus, the same rationale
applies here that applied in Dewsnup: without clear language or at least explicit
legislative history, it should not be assumed that Congress changed the pre-Code law
to permit home mortgage strip down in Chapter 13 banluptcy.
371. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct 773, 778 (1992).
372. The Court did so over Justice Scalia's strong dissent. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at
780 ("When § 506(d) refers to an 'allowed secured claim,' it can only be referring to
that allowed 'secured claim' so carefully described two brief subsections earlier."); see
Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Sain-Dean (In re Sainz-Dean), 143 B.R. 784 (D. Colo.
1992) (strongly criticizing the Dewsnup majority for refusing to give the words "al-
lowed secured claim" the § 506(a) meaning "three paragraphs later" in § 506(d)).
373. See supra notes 356.58 and accompanying text.
374. Id.
375. See supra note 218.
claim" include the entirety of the lien rights, even if the term "secured
claim" meant the § 506(a) secured claim.' In fact, some courts have con-
sidered this to be the plain meaning of the language."
Further, although § 506(a) may bifurcate the undersecured mortgagee's
claim, there is no explicit authority in the Bankruptcy Code for bifurcat-
ing the undersecured mortgagee's lien. Claims and liens are not the
same; each is defined separately.' As we learn from Dewsnup, bifurca-
tion of a claim does not necessarily entail bifurcation of the lien, and
certainly does not necessarily entail strip down.'m Another lesson from
Dewsnup is that pre-Code bankruptcy law (outside of the corporate reor-
ganization provisions) did not provide for scaling down of liens even
when unsecured claims were modified or discharged.' Two other les-
sons from Dewsnup-that specific authority is needed to strip down liens
and that courts should be slow to interpret ambiguous language as pro-
viding that authority, at least in the absence of clear legislative
history'-indicate that mortgage liens should not be bifurcated in the
absence of clear textual authority, or at least clear legislative history.'
Certainly, if a mortgagee in a Chapter 7 case obtains relief from the auto-
matic stay' and seeks to foreclose, the mortgagee would not be ex-
pected to act as though it held two liens on the property. Thus, it would
be reasonable to think that all of the nonbankruptcy lien rights of
undersecured mortgagees are encompassed within the phrase "rights of
holders of secured claims."
Of course it would be possible to read "rights of holders of secured
claims" in the context of the undersecured mortgagee to mean "the
rights the mortgagee would have had under nonbankruptcy law if the
mortgage were only for an amount equal to the value of the collateral."
The authors suggest, however, that such a reading is not demanded by
the language of § 1322(b)(2).
Further, would Congress have thought that it was authorizing the elim-
ination of liens when it authorized modification of the rights of holders
376. See Klingenberg, supra note 4, at 453 n.58 & at 463.
377. See, e.g., Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 129 B.R. 98, 103
(N.D. Tex. 1991), ofd, 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654
(U.S. Dec. 7, 1992) (No. 92-641); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1990); In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 705-06 (D.N.D. 1988).
378. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (Supp. III 1991) (defining "claim"); id, § 101(37) (Supp.
I 1991) (defining "lien").
379. See supra text accompanying note 283.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 278-79.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 290-91.
382. See supra text accompanying note 290.
383. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
[Vol. 20: 425, 1993] Home Mortgage Strip Down in Chapter 13
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
of unsecured claims?" That would seem incongruous; the concept that
a lien is part of the unsecured claim rights of a creditor is at best
forced.
D. Reprise of the Pre-Code Law and the Legislative History
As some of the courts and commentators have pointed out, the "other
than" clause, combined with the cure provision of § 1322(b)(5), probably
was designed to codify a practice which had developed under the old
Bankruptcy Act.' Under the Act, Chapter XIII plans were not permit-
ted to deal at all with claims secured by real property.' The courts
nonetheless found a way to permit debtors to cure and reinstate default-
ed mortgages. The plan could say nothing about the mortgage, but the
courts held that bankruptcy referees 7 had authority to enjoin mortgage
foreclosures on appropriate terms.' The appropriate terms were that
the debtors had to keep up their regular payments and cure the defaults
by paying off the arrearages within a time set by the referee.' The ref-
erees had no authority to strip away liens on real property, and that was
not the result of the practice.'s Dewsnup teaches no less."
The United States Bankruptcy Commission, which was formed in 1970
to reformulate the bankruptcy laws,' incorporated that practice into
the terms of its proposed bill. It appears that the Senate wished to
384. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
385. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 243 n.12 (5th
Cir. 1984); Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 29 n.7 (2d Cir. 1982)
(explaining § 1322(b)(5) as "a statutory codification of the practice developed under
former Chapters XI and XII"); In re Brown, 91 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988);
United Cos. Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 B.R. 178, 190 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980); 5 COLUER
ON BANRuPrcy, supra note 223, 1322.09[4], at 1322-25 (stating that "section
1322(b)(5) was intended to codify the practice under which foreclosure was enjoined
during the pendency of a Chapter XII plan under the former Bankruptcy Act, with
the debtor given a reasonable amount of time to cure defaults"). Grubbs quotes
language from Brantley, which cites Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d
566 (4th Cir. 1963) and In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
386. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L No. 61, 30 Stat. 544-66, repealed by Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
387. Bankruptcy referees are now bankruptcy judges.
388. See Grubbs, 730*F.2d at 243 n.12; see also Hallenbeck, 323 F.2d 566.
389. See Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 29 n.7 (2d Cir. 1982).
390. See Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 243 n.12; see also Halienbeck, 323 F.2d 566.
391. See supra notes 228-95 and accompanying text.
392. Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1990).
393. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pts. I and II (1973), reprinted in
retain that practice and not otherwise allow debtors to modify any real
property mortgagees' rights in any way.' The House, on the other
hand, appears to have wanted to permit modification of any and all real
property mortgages.3" It appears that the compromise was to allow mort-
gages other than home mortgages on the debtor's principal residence to
be modified.' The old Act practice of cure and maintenance of pay-
ments that was codified in § 1322(b)(5) would be the only way for debt-
ors to deal with home mortgages in their plan."
If Congress indeed intended to codify the old Act practice with regard
to home mortgages, then it probably follows that Congress did not in-
tend to allow home mortgage strip down. None of the circuit level au-
thority dealing with that practice allowed strip down of real estate mort-
[Appendix 2] COWER ON BANKRuPrcy, supra note 110, Part L Although the Wilson
court, because it took the Commission Report out of context, thought otherwise, the
Commission apparently did not believe that mortgages could be stripped down under
its bill. See IUndauer, supra note 4, at 272 un. 91-92.
394. See supra note 111. See also Wi/son, 895 F.2d at 123, 128; In re Glen, 760
F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. First Fed., 474 U.S.
849 (1985); In re Seldel, 752 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1985); Grubbs v. Houston
First Am. Sav. As'n, 730 F.2d 236, 245 & n.13 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); In re Har-
ris, 94 B.R. 832, 838 (D.NJ. 1989); In re Foster, 61 B.R. 492, 495 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1986); Elnbinder, Curing Mortgage Defaults Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code, in 1982 Ann. Surv. of Bankruptcy Law 493, 495.
395. See supra note 110. See also Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Noble-
man), 968 F.2d 483, 489 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992) (No. 92-641);
Bellamy v. Federal Home Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 181 (2d Cir.
1992); Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128. The Bellamy court noted that the House version
promoted the fresh start objective of the bankruptcy code. In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d at
181. It is not at all clear, however, that even the House thought mortgage strip down
could be accomplished if the debtor sought to cure and reinstate the mortgage under
§ 1322(b)(5).
396. See supra note 182. See also Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Noble-
man), 968 F.2d 483, 489 (5th Cir.) (noting that the final version was characterized as
a compromise agreement), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992) (No. 92-641); Bellamy
v.- Federal Home Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 182 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that obviously the final version of § 1322(b)(2) represented a compromise);
Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1990) (explain-
ing the final version as a compromise agreement).
397. This is suggested by the floor statements of the bill's managers subsequent to
the conference committee:
Under the House amendment [which became law] the plan may modify the
rights of holders of secured claims other than a claim secured by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence. It is intended
that a claim secured by the debtor's principal residence may be treated with
under [sic] section 1322(b)(5) of the House amendment
124 CONG. REc. Hi1089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprint.
ed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6481; 124 CONG. REC. S17406 (daily ed. Oct 6, 1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6550.
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gages.' The Supreme Court in Dewsnup states that strip down was not
allowed under the pre-Code law.'
E. The Meaning of "Secured Claims" in § 1322(b)(5)"
In Bellamy, the mortgagee (Federal Home) argued that debtors who
chose to use § 1322(b)(5) to cure and maintain payments could not strip
down their home mortgages even if the "other than" clause would permit
it." The authors submit that Federal Home was right, but for reasons
which do not seem to have been previously advanced.
Under § 1322(b)(5), a debtor whose mortgage is in default may cure
the default by paying the arrearages within a reasonable time.' If the
mortgagee accelerated the debt before the debtor filed the Chapter 13
petition, the cure accomplishes a deacceleration of the debt, reinstating
the original payment schedule. But for § 1322(b)(5), the "other than"
clause would allow the mortgagee to insist on immediate full payment of
the accelerated mortgage debt (or at least payment of the § 506(a) se-
cured claim if the court permits strip down). The cure provision of §
1322(b)(5) allows debtors to pay off the arrearages over the course of
the plan instead of requiring immediate payment.' Without the cure
provision of § 1322(b)(5), most debtors in default would be unable to
retain their homes in Chapter 13.'
398. See, e.g., Hallenbeck v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
399. See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however,
that the Senate Report on its version of the bankruptcy bill states, in its discussion
of § 506, that the § 506(a) meaning is intended "[t]hroughout the bill." See supra
note 188. Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent in Dewsnup discussed that
statement from the Senate Report.
400. Section 1322(b)(5) provides:
Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may ... (5) not-
withstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the curing of any
default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case
is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last pay-
ment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1988).
401. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176,
184-85 (2d Cir. 1992). See also Klingenberg, supra note 4, at 463.
402. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988).
403. See id. (stating that the plan may provide for the curing of any default within
a reasonable time).
404. See supra notes 313-17 and accompanying text.
Section 1322(b)(5) is limited in application to "any unsecured claim or
secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on which
the final payment under the plan is due."" To see why that limitation
creates problems for the pro-strip down position, we must see how
courts that allow home mortgage strip down treat the stripped-down
mortgage. As the BeUamy court pointed out, the courts do not allow the
debtor to reduce the monthly mortgage payment; rather, they require
that the debtor maintain the same monthly payments." Because the
debtor is paying on a stripped-down mortgage, the mortgage is paid off
much sooner than the parties originally envisioned.' In Nobelman, for
example, the monthly mortgage payments of $675.82 would pay off the
$23,500 § 506(a) secured claim at 11.5 percent interest" in less than
four years, some twenty years earlier than the original mortgage payment
end date of July 1, 2014.ee
Beyond the obvious point that losing twenty years of payments may be
a devastating blow to a creditor, the curious question is when the "last
payment" is due on the secured claim for purposes of § 1322(b)(5). It
would seem that if the "secured claim" is simply the § 506(a) secured
claim, then the last payment in Nobelman would not be due in 2014, but
in 1994, only four years after the filing of the petition."' If the
Nobelmans' plan was a five-year plan, they would pay off the stripped-
down secured claim before the end of the plan! Does that mean the
Nobelmans in fact should not have been permitted to cure defaults under
§ 1322(b)(5) because the final payment on the secured claim was due
before the last payment under the planV"A commonsense reading of §
405. 11 U.S.C. §. 1322(b)(5) (1988).
406. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176,
184-85 (2d Cir. 1992).
407. See id. at 185 (stating that the debtor must make scheduled mortgage pay-
ments only until the § 506(a) secured claim is fully paid); see also Klingenberg, supra
note 4, at 464.
408. Using mortgage tables we determined that for a $68,250 loan to be paid off in
30 years at $675.82 per month, the interest rate had to be 11.596. Of course that is
only approximate because it was a variable rate loan. See supra note 205.
409. See supra text accompanying note 205.
410. The petition was filed in 1990. Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank (In re
Nobelman), 129 B.R. 98, 99 (N.D. Tex. 1991), qffd, 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1992) (No. 92-641).
411. The Fifth Circuit in Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Assoc., 730 F.2d 236
(5th Cir. 1984), explained that even if a home mortgage cannot be cured under §
,1322(b)(5), it may be able to be cured under § 1322(b)(3). If the court in Grubbs is
right, and home mortgages can be cured under § 1322(b)(3) when (b)(5) is not avail-
able, then the Nobelmans still could have cured and reinstated their mortgage. In In
re Franklin, 126 B.R. 702, 712 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991), the court stated in dictum
that if, pursuant to § 1325(a)(5)(B), the debtor could pay off the home mortgagee's §
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1322(b)(5) shows that it refers to the last date on which payment is due
on the whole mortgage claim. To interpret § 1322(b)(5) otherwise would
confuse matters and require valuing the collateral so that the amount of
the § 506(a) secured claim could be determined in order to see how long
it would take for the secured claim to be paid off at the regular monthly
payment rate. In addition, if debtors like the Nobelmans were to finish
their payments before the end of their plan, could it be said that they
had complied with § 1322(b)(5)'s requirement of "maintenance of pay-
ments while the case is pending"?
Thus, it seems obvious that Congress meant to refer to the entire
mortgage debt, not to some bifurcated portion of it, when it chose to use
the term "secured claim" in § 1322(b)(5). Again, this is not a section that
specifically requires that an amount of a secured or unsecured claim be
determined."'2 Rather, it is perfectly consistent with Dewsnup to give
"secured claim" in § 1322(b)(5) its general meaning: the entire claim
secured by a lien, without regard to the value of the collateral.
It is possible to argue that the "truly" secured portion of an
undersecured mortgage is always paid off with the final payment. After
all, the lien remains under nonbankruptcy law until the last payment is
made; thus, absent strip down, the next few years' worth of scheduled
payments on an undersecured mortgage-the payments that would reduce
the debt to the value of the property-are payments on the unsecured
portion.""' Therefore, the final payment date under the mortgage agree-
ment could be seen to be the date on which, if all the payments were
made, the final payment would be made on the § 506(a) secured claim.
However, that argument proves too much. If payments' on an
undersecured claim are initially assignable to the unsecured portion, why
506(a) claim in full with interest during the plan, then the debtor would not need to
use § 1322(b)(5) to cure and, thus, would not need to pay arrearages in addition to
the § 506(a) secured claim. The court, however, failed to understand that the
mortgagee's right to foreclose if the default were not cured could not be taken away
from the mortgagee because the "other than" clause would prohibit any such modifi-
cation of the mortgagee's rights.
412. See supra notes 362-65 and accompanying text
413. Cf. Banish v. Public Fin. Corp. (In re Dennis), 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981)
(stating that for purposes of preference law, payments on an undersecured debt are
considered to be payments on the § 506(a) unsecured claim). Barash unnecessarily
made a complex matter out of the simple proposition that if a payment on an
undersecured claim does not result in a release of collateral, it will by definition
reduce the unsecured claim, not the secured claim, which remains by definition static
at the value of the collateral.
does a Chapter 13 debtor have to cure by paying all of the arrearages?
The arrearages-in part, at least-are due on the § 506(a) unsecured claim,
and § 1322(b)(5) allows the debtor to cure and maintain payments on
just the secured claim if the debtor wishes."' Of course, the arrearages
could not be allocated solely to the § 506(a) unsecured claim. The princi-
pal portions of the missed mortgage payments would indeed be pay-
ments on the § 506(a) unsecured claim, but the interest portions would
cover interest on both the secured and unsecured claims. Is it possible
that Congress intended the courts to figure out which portion of the
arrearages should be allocated to the § 506(a) secured claim, and which
to the unsecured claim, and to require cure of only the former amount?
The pro-strip down circuits have not taken that position,"" although it
seems to flow logically from their approach of assuming that the words
"secured claim" as used in § 1322 bear the technical § 506(a) mean-
ing.
16
This complexity arises out of an apparently easy-to-apply section only
if the meaning of "secured claim" in § 1322(b)(5) is the technical § 506(a)
meaning. Congress intended no such complexity. Rather, Congress in-
tended to use the term "secured claim" in its general sense, not the tech-
nical § 506(a) sense. This conclusion is consistent with the practice un-
der the Bankruptcy Act of allowing cure and maintenance of payments,
but not strip down.
This level of complexity also infects and undercuts the pro-strip down
argument in other ways. If it is only the § 506(a) secured claim which
must be left unmodified, and if all the principal and a portion of the
interest charge on current payments to undersecured mortgagees are in
fact payments on the § 506(a) unsecured claim, why do pro-strip down
courts as in Bellamy require debtors to maintain the full amount of the
monthly payment?"7 If both § 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5) use "secured
414. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988).
415. See, e.g., Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Say., 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992) (re-
quiring that debtor pay all arrearages in full to cure under § 1322(b)(5) in addition to
maintaining regular monthly payments, and holding that payment on arrearages would
not be considered to reduce the principal amount of the stripped-down mortgage).
416. The Second Circuit in BeUamgy allowed cure and reinstatement of a stripped-
down mortgage and required full payment of all arrearages and maintenance of the
full monthly payment, even though the debtors had taken the position in the bank-
ruptcy court that they could reduce their monthly payments. Bellamy v. Fed. Home
Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992). See supru notes 137-
96 for a full discussion of BeUamy.
417. See BeUamy, 962 F.2d at 184-85. See also In re Hayes, 111 B.R. 924, 927-28
(Bankr. D. Ore. 1990) (concluding that bifurcation is permissible, but that the plan
cannot alter the interest rate or amount of the installment payment); In re Shaver, 58
B.R. 166, 167 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (same); In re Wilkinson, 33 B.R. 933, 935
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
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claim[s]" in the technical § 506(a) sense, why must the debtor do more
than maintain the portion of the regular monthly payment which in fact
would go toward the § 506(a) secured claim? We suppose the term
"maintain" in § 1322(b)(5) leads the courts to refuse to allow reduction
of monthly payments. However, if the term "maintain" means that the
amount may not be reduced, even though part is on account of the §
506(a) unsecured claim, does that not indicate that what is being main-
tained is the payment schedule on the entire debt, not just on the §
506(a) claim? And if that is true, then how can we avoid the conclusion
that the term "secured claim" in § 1322(b)(5) bears the general meaning
rather than the § 506(a) technical meaning?
If the authors are correct, then most home mortgagees cannot strip
down their mortgages even if the "other than" clause does not apply.
That is a result of the debtor's decision to cure and reinstate. If the "oth-
er than" clause does not apply because the mortgagee took more collat-
eral than just the home, and if the debtor does not use § 1322(b)(5), then
the debtor can choose to treat the mortgagee's § 506(a) claim under §
1325(a)(5)(B). 9 If the debtor can do so successfully, then the plan can
strip down the mortgage. There will be rare cases in which that may be
possible, but usually it will not.
If the term "secured claim" in § 1322(b)(5) bears a general. meaning, as
the above argument demonstrates, then it should also bear that meaning
in § 1322(b)(2). Sections 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5) are obviously intended to
work together,"'8 (b)(5) itself refers to (b)(2), and the legislative history
indicates that mortgages which cannot be modified because of the "other
than" clause are then to be dealt with (if at all) under (b)(5).' We do
not mean that (b)(5) may only be used with regard to home mortgages,
but they are its natural and most common subject." Common sense
suggests the terms "secured claims" in § 1322(b)(2) and "secured claim"
in § 1322(b)(5) should bear the same meaning. The authors submit that
meaning is the general meaning, not the technical § 506(a) meaning.'
418. See supra note 318 for the text of § 1325(a)(5)(B).
419. See e.g., Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Assoc., 730 F.2d 236, 241 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1984) (stating that Congress provided an exception to (b)(2) in (b)(5)).
420. See supra note 397 and accompanying text.
421. This is so because the language of the section restricts it to long-term debt-
the last payment must be due after the date on which the final payment under the
plan is due. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988).
422. Admittedly, this argument is ironic in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Dewenup that "secured claim" did not have the same meaning in subsections (a) and
F. The Remaining Meaning in the "Other Than" Clause
If most debtors must use § 1322(b)(5), and if § 1322(b)(5) prohibits
strip down, what meaning is left for the "other than" clause under the
authors' approach? We find that question to be troubling. If little mean-
ing is left, the authors' approach would be subject to the same criticism
as the pro-strip down approach.
We recognize that the "other than" clause would be more important if
§ 1322(b)(5) did not itself prohibit strip down in cases in which it is
used. However, Congress could not have intended the resulting complex-
ity in application of § 1322(b)(5). Although our conclusions mean that
the "other than" clause is less important than the legislative history
would suggest, especially in the case in which a debtor must use §
1322(b)(5) to cure arrearages, it leaves intact the result Congress appar-
ently intended and gives the "other than" clause substantial meaning in
other cases. It is more acceptable to interpret the "other than" clause as
providing "overlapping armor" to protect home mortgagees rather than to
interpret it so that it has little meaning and leaves a gaping hole in their
protection.
There is one important case in which § 1322(b)(5) cannot prevent strip
down but the "other than" clause can: the case in which the debtors
have managed to keep up payments on their mortgage even though they
are in financial distress. Debtors may default on all other debts before
risking their home by defaulting on their home mortgage. If a debtor
does not default on the mortgage, or manages to cure any default under
nonbankruptcy law, then the debtor will not need to use § 1322(b)(5) to
cure and reinstate the mortgage. In such a case, the "other than" clause
would appear to provide special protection for the home mortgagee if it
is interpreted so as to preclude strip down. Obviously, § 1322(b)(5) can-
not provide that protection if it is not applicable.
In the above scenario, the "other than" clause would thus have sub-
stantial meaning if interpreted so as to preclude home mortgage strip
down. If the debtor does not need to use § 1322(b)(5), then the "other
than" clause matters. If the "other than" clause applies, strip down is
prohibited. If it does not apply, strip down would be permissible.
G. Further Observations
Next, we provide brief observations on two related questions. If the
"other than" clause and § 1322(b)(5) prohibit home mortgage strip down
in most cases, under what authority is strip down affirmatively autho-
(d) of § 506. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
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rized in the other cases? What is the extent of that authorization?
Section 1322(b)(2) authorizes the plan to modify the rights of holders
of secured and unsecured claims. Section 1327(c) states that "except as
provided in the plan or in the order confrming the plan, the property
vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this section is free and
clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the
plan."' Section 1322(b)(2), alone or in combination with § 1327(c),
may authorize strip down when the "other than" clause does not apply
and § 1322(b)(5) is not being used.
If §§ 1322(b)(2) and 1327(c) do provide the authorization for strip
down, then the "other than" clause has meaning-it will block strip
down where it applies even in cases in which the debtor does not use §
1322(b)(5). Thus the "other than" clause will have substantial meaning.
It is not clear, however, that strip down should be permitted where the
plan does not provide for payment of the value of the collateral with
interest during the term of the plan, pursuant to § 1325(a)(5)(B). Section
1325(a)(5)(8) describes how the plan must treat a secured claim which
is "provided for by the plan."' The creditor's lien must be retained,
and the creditor must receive payments with a present value equal to the
amount of the § 506(a) secured claim.' The legislative history makes
explicit what is implicit in § 1325(a)(5)(B)-the lien required by §
1325(a)(5)(B) is for the amount of payments required by the section."
Thus the undersecured creditor whose secured claim is provided for
under § 1325(a)(5)(B) will suffer strip down of the lien.
Nothing in the legislative history suggests that liens can be stripped
down without the application of § 1325(a)(5)(B), which ensures that the
creditor will receive the full present value of its lien. As Professor
Howard-a proponent of home mortgage strip down and severe critic of
Dewsnup-points out, the denial of present value to mortgagees was the
reason the Supreme Court held that the Frazier-Lemke Act effected an
unconstitutional taking."T
423. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(c) (1988).
424. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (1988).
425. Id
426. "Of course the secured creditor's lien only secures the value of the collateral."
124 CONG. REc. H11107 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124
CONG. REC. S17423 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
427. Howard, supra note 215, at 525. She argues, however, that a bankruptcy stat-
ute could constitutionally deny full present value to creditors who took mortgages
after the effective date of the statute.
Full present value need not be given if the creditor receives the full
payments to which the creditor agreed. Thus in Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions, a mortgagee with a long-term debt at a below market interest rate
can be held to that bargain even though present value equal to the face
amount of the debt-or even equal to the value of the collateral if it is
less-is not received. The Chapter 11 plan can leave the creditor's se-
cured claim unimpaired;' the mortgagee gets what it bargained for and
can blame no one else if the interest rate is below market.
The pernicious effect of home mortgage strip down in Chapter 13 how-
ever would be that mortgagees with below market interest rates might
receive neither what they bargained for nor full present value. The court
in BeUamyj dismissed Federal Home's argument that this would be im-
proper by saying that the mortgagee's "'assurance' in this regard "is pro-
vided by virtue of the fact that the Chapter 13 plan may not modify what
was bargained for in respect to its secured claim."' The court ignored
the fact that a mortgagee who bargained for 30 years of monthly pay-
ments is hardly receiving what it bargained for if it receives fewer years
of payments because of mortgage strip down. Courts have been careful
to limit the apparently broad scope of § 1327(c) to avoid constitutional
problems and to stay faithful to the principles of Long v. BuUard.' For
example, the court in In re Simmons" held that § 1327(c) did not
eliminate the creditor's lien even though the plan in a sense "provided
for" the creditor's claim-by treating it as an unsecured claim.'
If the courts ultimately determine that strip down can only occur if the
creditor receives full present value during the plan under §
1325(a)(5)(B), then perhaps the "other than" clause will have little mean-
ing.' Until then, it serves the important function of prohibiting, as a
matter of positive statute law, the strip down of home mortgages.
428. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(l) and (2) (1988). The present value requirement of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(I)(II) only applies to classes of impaired claims. By making the §
1111(b)(2) election, the undersecured creditor can ensure that the entire claim is left
unimpaired, see 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1988), thus ensuring that the plan cannot
leave only the creditor's § 506(a) secured claim unimpaired and strip down the lien.
429. Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176,
186 (2d Cir. 1992).
430. 117 U.S. 617 (1886).
431. 765 F.2d 517, 555 (5th Cir. 1985).
432. l
433. As noted above, the cases will be rare in which debtors could pay the amount
of their first mortgage with interest during a three- to five-year plan. See supra text
accompanying note 418.
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H. Policy Implications
An interpretation of §§ 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5) will also benefit from the
context of unmistakable bankruptcy policies. We summarize very briefly
here arguments made ably by others.
1. Intrinsic Policy Concerns
There are three relevant intrinsic policies of the Bankruptcy Code-
policies that act directly on those who find themselves enmeshed in
bankruptcy as debtors or creditors.
First, bankruptcy should help to provide a fresh start for the "honest
but unfortunate debtor."' Home mortgage strip down does little to ad-
vance that policy. In the typical case, home mortgage strip down will
provide no immediate benefit to the debtor. For example, the debtors in
Bellamy' will have to make their regular monthly payments without
reduction for many years; they will not benefit from the strip down for a
long time. By the time they see any benefit the financial distress that
prompted their Chapter 13 filing will be ancient history. As the commen-
tators have pointed out, this makes little sense in terms of providing a
fresh start to debtors in financial distress." We may also question
whether a debtor who can maintain the mortgage payments is so "unfor-
tunate" as to deserve the benefits of strip down.
Second, debtors should be assisted in maintaining home ownership
during times of financial distress. Section 1322(b)(5) was designed to
codify pre-Code practices which assisted debtors in curing defaults on
home mortgages and maintaining home ownership. That policy is of
course consistent with the policy of encouraging home ownership that is
reflected in many national programs such as the Veterans' Affairs Depart-
ment and Federal Housing Administration programs." Strip down does
little to further this intrinsic policy of the Bankruptcy Code. Only those
434. Grogan v. Garner, Ill S. CL 654, 659 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
435. Bellamy v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d
Cir. 1992).
436. KUngenberg, supra note 4, at 464; Lindauer, supra note 4, at 277-81; see also
Canzoneri, supra note 4, at 19.
437. See Polk, Chapter 13 Cramdoum, supra note 4, at 297; Polk, Bankruptcy
Beast, supra note 4, at 37.
who can afford their mortgage payments benefit from strip down in the
typical case. They could keep their homes without strip down, and the
benefit they receive does not come for years.
Third, debtors should not receive windfalls at the expense of secured
creditors. In particular, Dewsnup v. Timm"0 identifies a policy of re-
specting the bargains of debtors and secured creditors to the extent of
preserving to the secured creditors the right to look to future apprecia-
tion of the collateral.' Congress specifically protected lenders in this
way in Chapter 11 cases by allowing them to make the § 1111(b)(2) elec-
tion;"' Congress probably did not anticipate that eleven years after en-
actment of the Bankruptcy Code the circuit courts would suddenly de-
cide that home mortgage strip down was permissible in Chapter 13.1"
Judging from the way Congress handled the issue in Chapter 11, Con-
gress probably did not intend to allow Chapter 13 debtors to strip down
liens at the bottom of a real estate market and then reap the windfall of
riding the market back up.'
2. Extrinsic Policy Concerns
There are also three extrinsic policy concerns-policy concerns that
relate to the effect of the bankruptcy laws on those not enmeshed in
them.
First, strip down is becoming so widely used that it threatens to fur-
ther damage the already weak home lending industry. Home mortgage
lenders who sell their loans on the secondary market, as most must,0
are being required to buy back stripped-down loans and bear the
cost." One bankruptcy judge has noted that "not a day goes by" that
the court is not requested to strip down a home mortgage.' The cost
of further weakening of the home lending industry may be borne by the
taxpayers, as additional banks and savings and loans fail.'
Second, strip down impedes the national policy, reflected in numerous
438. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
439. Id. at 777-78.
440. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1988); see In re Griffiths, 27 B.R. 873, 876 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1983) (stating that purpose of 1111(b)(2) election is to prevent "cash out"); In
re Kvamme, 93 B.R. 698 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988) (illustrating simply and clearly the
operation of the 1111(b)(2) election).
441. The Hougland case was decided in 1989, 11 years after the enactment of the
1978 Bankruptcy Code.
442. See, e.g., In re Woodall, 123 B.R. 95, 97-98 (W.D. 0kia. 1990).
443. See Polk, Chapter 13 Cramdown, supra note 4, at 296.
444. See Polk, Chapter 13 Cramdoum, supra note 4, at 296.
445. In re Davidoff, 136 B.R. 567, 568 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
446. See Lindauer, supra note 4, at 280, n.142.
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government programs, of helping first time home buyers, including those
who can afford only a small down payment. Strip down has its greatest
effect on lenders who take small down payments. The government does
not seem willing to bear the cost of strip down even though government
loan guarantee programs are designed to induce lenders to make low-
down-payment home loans;" the Federal Housing Administration and
the Veterans' Affairs Department have determined that their loan
guarantees will not cover losses caused by strip down.' If the govern-
ment is either unwilling or unable to bear the cost of strip down, it
seems likely that many of the financial institutions which have up to now
participated in the government programs will pull out or reduce their
participation."" Indeed, innovative private programs" for enabling
would-be homeowners with low down payments to buy homes will be
discouraged. The effect on those who are only marginally able to qualify
for home loans may be substantial; by allowing debtors like the BeUamys
who can afford their mortgage payments to pay off their mortgages years
ahead of schedule, the courts may be preventing others from even be-
coming homeowners.
Third, the effect on the economy may be substantial. One of the rea-
sons the federal government supports home ownership programs is the
multiplying effect of home construction spending on the economy. To
the extent that strip down reduces the ability of marginal buyers to pur-
chase homes, the economy as a whole may be affected.
V. CONCLUSION
The authors submit that the Bankruptcy Code prohibits home mort-
gage strip down unless the following two conditions are met: (1) the
mortgagee has taken other collateral for the loan in addition to the
home, so that the "other than" clause does not apply; and (2) the Chap-
447. Polk, Chapter 13 Cramdoum, supra note 4, at 297.
448. Lindauer, supra note 4, at 279.
449. See Polk, supra note 4, at 297-98. The default rate on government guaranteed
home loans is much higher than on other mortgages. See Debra Cope, Home Loan
Deinquencies Take a Turn for the Worse, Am. BANKR., Sept. 4, 1992, at 2 (stating
that the default rate on all loans is 4.770A versus 7.31% on FHA loans and 6.7396 on
VA loans).
450. For example, Countrywide Funding has begun a program under which a 5%
down payment (2% of which can be contributed by the seller, by a relative, or by
anyone else) is sufficient. Gregory A. Lumsden, First Time Buyers: the Key to
Today's Real Estate Market, 14 LA. Bus. J. IIB(I) (Nov. 16, 1992).
ter 13 plan does not utilize § 1322(b)(5) to cure a mortgage default.
Moreover, the issue of home mortgage strip down illustrates a fact
about the Bankruptcy Code: its language will not stand up to the stress
created by hyper-technical cross-referencing of terms. It must be read
with sensitivity to context and with a large measure of common sense.
As a final example, we point out that a hyper-technical cross-referenc-
ing of §§ 1322(b)(5), 1325(a)(5)(B), and 1328(a) would lead to the con-
clusion that no plan could be confirmed in which the debtors used §
1322(b)(5) to cure defaulted home mortgages." The language of the
Code is not a mathematical puzzle; it must not be treated as such with
an "overly technocratic"' approach.
We do not propose that courts abandon reliance on the Code's lan-
guage or that they elevate legislative history to the level of law. We
merely propose that courts consider a commonsense understanding of
what Congress intended to accomplish. If courts will do that, perhaps
troubling decisions like the pro-strip down cases criticized here-and
others, such as Durrewtt and Levit4 -may be avoided.
451. It appears that a mortgagee's secured claim is "provided for" as that term is
used in Chapter 13 when defaults are cured and the mortgage is reinstated under §
1322(b)(5). See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1) (1988) (allowing discharge of "all debts pro-
vided for by the plan" except debts "provided for" under § 1322(b)(5)). Section
1325(a)(5) applies "with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan ... _" 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1988). Thus, on a plain meaning reading of Chapter
13, it would appear that debtors who cure and reinstate their mortgages under §
1322(b)(5) must comply with § 1325(a)(5), which requires that the debtor either
obtain the mortgagee's acceptance of the plan, surrender the home, or pay the entire
amount of the mortgagee's § 506(a) secured claim during the three to five years of
the plan. That is an absurd result.
452. In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
453. Durrett v. Washington Natl Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (permitting
fraudulent transfer attack on regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale).
454. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying one-
year look-back period for insider preferences to noninsider who had obtained guaran-
tee from insider).
